feat: add Fail2ban security detection console

2026-08-14 10:58:18 +08:00
parent b78faa1aa2
commit d30d9ea4d0
45 changed files with 1967 additions and 18 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+CREATE TABLE "SecurityDetectionRule" (
+  "id" TEXT NOT NULL,
+  "code" TEXT NOT NULL,
+  "name" TEXT NOT NULL,
+  "sourceType" TEXT NOT NULL,
+  "enabled" BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
+  "threshold" INTEGER NOT NULL,
+  "windowSeconds" INTEGER NOT NULL,
+  "cooldownSeconds" INTEGER NOT NULL,
+  "severity" TEXT NOT NULL,
+  "defaultBlockSeconds" INTEGER NOT NULL,
+  "maximumBlockSeconds" INTEGER NOT NULL,
+  "configVersion" INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
+  "effectiveVersion" INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+  "applyStatus" TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'pending',
+  "lastApplyError" TEXT,
+  "pendingConfig" JSONB,
+  "createdAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  "updatedAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL,
+  CONSTRAINT "SecurityDetectionRule_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
+);
+CREATE TABLE "SecurityDetectionEvent" (
+  "id" TEXT NOT NULL, "eventKey" TEXT NOT NULL, "ruleId" TEXT NOT NULL,
+  "sourceIp" TEXT NOT NULL, "sourcePort" INTEGER, "accountHash" TEXT,
+  "path" TEXT, "protocol" TEXT, "resultCode" TEXT, "evidence" JSONB,
+  "occurredAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL, "createdAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  CONSTRAINT "SecurityDetectionEvent_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
+);
+CREATE TABLE "SecurityAlert" (
+  "id" TEXT NOT NULL, "fingerprint" TEXT NOT NULL, "ruleId" TEXT NOT NULL,
+  "sourceIp" TEXT NOT NULL, "severity" TEXT NOT NULL, "status" TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'open',
+  "eventCount" INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, "windowStartedAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL,
+  "firstOccurredAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL, "lastOccurredAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL,
+  "acknowledgedAt" TIMESTAMP(3), "acknowledgedById" TEXT, "ignoredAt" TIMESTAMP(3),
+  "ignoredById" TEXT, "ignoreReason" TEXT, "blockId" TEXT,
+  "createdAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP, "updatedAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL,
+  CONSTRAINT "SecurityAlert_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
+);
+CREATE TABLE "SecurityBlock" (
+  "id" TEXT NOT NULL, "operationKey" TEXT NOT NULL, "alertId" TEXT, "sourceIp" TEXT NOT NULL,
+  "executor" TEXT NOT NULL, "status" TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'requested', "durationSeconds" INTEGER NOT NULL,
+  "reason" TEXT NOT NULL, "requestedById" TEXT NOT NULL, "requestedAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  "appliedAt" TIMESTAMP(3), "expiresAt" TIMESTAMP(3), "releasedAt" TIMESTAMP(3), "releasedById" TEXT,
+  "executorReference" TEXT, "lastError" TEXT, "createdAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  "updatedAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL, CONSTRAINT "SecurityBlock_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
+);
+CREATE TABLE "SecurityProtectedNetwork" (
+  "id" TEXT NOT NULL, "network" TEXT NOT NULL, "name" TEXT NOT NULL, "reason" TEXT NOT NULL,
+  "enabled" BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true, "createdById" TEXT NOT NULL,
+  "createdAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP, "updatedAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL,
+  CONSTRAINT "SecurityProtectedNetwork_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
+);
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "SecurityDetectionRule_code_key" ON "SecurityDetectionRule"("code");
+CREATE INDEX "SecurityDetectionRule_enabled_sourceType_idx" ON "SecurityDetectionRule"("enabled", "sourceType");
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "SecurityDetectionEvent_eventKey_key" ON "SecurityDetectionEvent"("eventKey");
+CREATE INDEX "SecurityDetectionEvent_ruleId_occurredAt_idx" ON "SecurityDetectionEvent"("ruleId", "occurredAt");
+CREATE INDEX "SecurityDetectionEvent_sourceIp_occurredAt_idx" ON "SecurityDetectionEvent"("sourceIp", "occurredAt");
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "SecurityAlert_fingerprint_key" ON "SecurityAlert"("fingerprint");
+CREATE INDEX "SecurityAlert_status_severity_lastOccurredAt_idx" ON "SecurityAlert"("status", "severity", "lastOccurredAt");
+CREATE INDEX "SecurityAlert_sourceIp_status_lastOccurredAt_idx" ON "SecurityAlert"("sourceIp", "status", "lastOccurredAt");
+CREATE INDEX "SecurityAlert_ruleId_status_lastOccurredAt_idx" ON "SecurityAlert"("ruleId", "status", "lastOccurredAt");
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "SecurityBlock_operationKey_key" ON "SecurityBlock"("operationKey");
+CREATE INDEX "SecurityBlock_status_expiresAt_idx" ON "SecurityBlock"("status", "expiresAt");
+CREATE INDEX "SecurityBlock_sourceIp_status_requestedAt_idx" ON "SecurityBlock"("sourceIp", "status", "requestedAt");
+CREATE INDEX "SecurityBlock_alertId_idx" ON "SecurityBlock"("alertId");
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "SecurityProtectedNetwork_network_key" ON "SecurityProtectedNetwork"("network");
+CREATE INDEX "SecurityProtectedNetwork_enabled_createdAt_idx" ON "SecurityProtectedNetwork"("enabled", "createdAt");
+ALTER TABLE "SecurityDetectionEvent" ADD CONSTRAINT "SecurityDetectionEvent_ruleId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("ruleId") REFERENCES "SecurityDetectionRule"("id") ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+ALTER TABLE "SecurityAlert" ADD CONSTRAINT "SecurityAlert_ruleId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("ruleId") REFERENCES "SecurityDetectionRule"("id") ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE;
+
+INSERT INTO "SecurityDetectionRule" ("id", "code", "name", "sourceType", "threshold", "windowSeconds", "cooldownSeconds", "severity", "defaultBlockSeconds", "maximumBlockSeconds", "configVersion", "effectiveVersion", "applyStatus", "updatedAt") VALUES
+('sec_admin_login', 'admin_login_failure', '运营端登录失败', 'application', 8, 600, 900, 'medium', 3600, 604800, 1, 1, 'effective', CURRENT_TIMESTAMP),
+('sec_client_login', 'client_login_failure', '客户端登录失败', 'application', 8, 600, 900, 'medium', 3600, 604800, 1, 1, 'effective', CURRENT_TIMESTAMP),
+('sec_ssh_auth', 'ssh_auth_failure', 'SSH认证失败', 'fail2ban', 6, 600, 1800, 'high', 86400, 604800, 1, 1, 'effective', CURRENT_TIMESTAMP),
+('sec_cmpp_auth', 'cmpp_auth_failure', 'CMPP认证失败', 'gateway', 5, 300, 900, 'high', 3600, 604800, 1, 1, 'effective', CURRENT_TIMESTAMP),
+('sec_cmpp_abuse', 'cmpp_protocol_abuse', 'CMPP协议滥用', 'gateway', 20, 60, 900, 'critical', 3600, 604800, 1, 1, 'effective', CURRENT_TIMESTAMP),
+('sec_http_key', 'http_invalid_api_key', 'HTTP错误密钥', 'application', 10, 300, 900, 'high', 3600, 604800, 1, 1, 'effective', CURRENT_TIMESTAMP),
+('sec_http_sign', 'http_signature_failure', 'HTTP签名错误', 'application', 10, 300, 900, 'high', 3600, 604800, 1, 1, 'effective', CURRENT_TIMESTAMP),
+('sec_http_replay', 'http_replay_attempt', 'HTTP重放尝试', 'application', 3, 600, 1800, 'critical', 86400, 604800, 1, 1, 'effective', CURRENT_TIMESTAMP),
+('sec_http_scan', 'http_malicious_scan', 'HTTP恶意扫描', 'fail2ban', 20, 60, 900, 'high', 3600, 604800, 1, 1, 'effective', CURRENT_TIMESTAMP);
@@ -2321,3 +2321,114 @@ model GatewayDownstreamRecoveryStatus {
  @@index([state, updatedAt])
  @@index([nextRetryAt])
 }
+
+model SecurityDetectionRule {
+  id                  String   @id @default(cuid())
+  code                String   @unique
+  name                String
+  sourceType          String
+  enabled             Boolean  @default(true)
+  threshold           Int
+  windowSeconds       Int
+  cooldownSeconds     Int
+  severity            String
+  defaultBlockSeconds Int
+  maximumBlockSeconds Int
+  configVersion       Int      @default(1)
+  effectiveVersion    Int      @default(0)
+  applyStatus         String   @default("pending")
+  lastApplyError      String?
+  pendingConfig       Json?
+  createdAt           DateTime @default(now())
+  updatedAt           DateTime @updatedAt
+
+  events SecurityDetectionEvent[]
+  alerts SecurityAlert[]
+
+  @@index([enabled, sourceType])
+}
+
+model SecurityDetectionEvent {
+  id          String   @id @default(cuid())
+  eventKey    String   @unique
+  ruleId      String
+  sourceIp    String
+  sourcePort  Int?
+  accountHash String?
+  path        String?
+  protocol    String?
+  resultCode  String?
+  evidence    Json?
+  occurredAt  DateTime
+  createdAt   DateTime @default(now())
+
+  rule SecurityDetectionRule @relation(fields: [ruleId], references: [id], onDelete: Restrict)
+
+  @@index([ruleId, occurredAt])
+  @@index([sourceIp, occurredAt])
+}
+
+model SecurityAlert {
+  id               String    @id @default(cuid())
+  fingerprint      String    @unique
+  ruleId           String
+  sourceIp         String
+  severity         String
+  status           String    @default("open")
+  eventCount       Int       @default(0)
+  windowStartedAt  DateTime
+  firstOccurredAt  DateTime
+  lastOccurredAt   DateTime
+  acknowledgedAt   DateTime?
+  acknowledgedById String?
+  ignoredAt        DateTime?
+  ignoredById      String?
+  ignoreReason     String?
+  blockId          String?
+  createdAt        DateTime  @default(now())
+  updatedAt        DateTime  @updatedAt
+
+  rule SecurityDetectionRule @relation(fields: [ruleId], references: [id], onDelete: Restrict)
+
+  @@index([status, severity, lastOccurredAt])
+  @@index([sourceIp, status, lastOccurredAt])
+  @@index([ruleId, status, lastOccurredAt])
+}
+
+model SecurityBlock {
+  id                String    @id @default(cuid())
+  operationKey      String    @unique
+  alertId           String?
+  sourceIp          String
+  executor          String
+  status            String    @default("requested")
+  durationSeconds   Int
+  reason            String
+  requestedById     String
+  requestedAt       DateTime  @default(now())
+  appliedAt         DateTime?
+  expiresAt         DateTime?
+  releasedAt        DateTime?
+  releasedById      String?
+  executorReference String?
+  lastError         String?
+  createdAt         DateTime  @default(now())
+  updatedAt         DateTime  @updatedAt
+
+  @@index([status, expiresAt])
+  @@index([sourceIp, status, requestedAt])
+  @@index([alertId])
+}
+
+model SecurityProtectedNetwork {
+  id          String   @id @default(cuid())
+  network     String   @unique
+  name        String
+  reason      String
+  enabled     Boolean  @default(true)
+  createdById String
+  createdAt   DateTime @default(now())
+  updatedAt   DateTime @updatedAt
+
+  @@index([enabled, createdAt])
+}
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ import { SmsConfigModule } from './sms-config/sms-config.module';
 import { TenantsModule } from './tenants/tenants.module';
 import { UsersModule } from './users/users.module';
 import { SignatureRetirementModule } from './signature-retirement/signature-retirement.module';
+import { SecurityDetectionModule } from './security-detection/security-detection.module';

@Module({
  imports: [
@@ -53,6 +54,7 @@ import { SignatureRetirementModule } from './signature-retirement/signature-reti
    InfrastructureMonitoringModule,
    OpenApiModule,
    SignatureRetirementModule,
+    SecurityDetectionModule,
  ],
  controllers: [HealthController],
  providers: [RequestContextMiddleware, SessionValidationMiddleware, ManualOperationAuditMiddleware],
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ import type { SessionRequest } from './session-validation.middleware';
 import { UsersService } from '../users/users.service';
 import { PrismaService } from '../prisma/prisma.service';
 import { Prisma } from '@prisma/client';
+import { requestContext } from '../common/request-context';
+import { SecurityDetectionService } from '../security-detection/security-detection.service';

 type CookieResponse = {
  cookie(name: string, value: string, options: Record<string, unknown>): void;
@@ -16,7 +18,7 @@ type CookieResponse = {
@ApiTags('auth')
@Controller()
 export class AuthController {
-  constructor(private readonly auth: AuthService, private readonly users: UsersService, private readonly sessions: SessionService, private readonly prisma: PrismaService) {}
+  constructor(private readonly auth: AuthService, private readonly users: UsersService, private readonly sessions: SessionService, private readonly prisma: PrismaService, private readonly security: SecurityDetectionService) {}

  @Get('admin/auth/captcha')
  adminCaptcha() {
@@ -25,7 +27,14 @@ export class AuthController {

  @Post('admin/auth/login')
  async adminLogin(@Body() body: LoginDto, @Req() request: SessionRequest, @Res({ passthrough: true }) response: CookieResponse) {
-    return this.finishLogin(await this.auth.login(body, 'admin'), request, response);
+    let result: Awaited<ReturnType<AuthService['login']>>;
+    try {
+      result = await this.auth.login(body, 'admin');
+    } catch (error) {
+      await this.recordLoginFailure('admin_login_failure', body.login, request).catch(() => undefined);
+      throw error;
+    }
+    return this.finishLogin(result, request, response);
  }

  @Get('client/auth/captcha')
@@ -35,7 +44,14 @@ export class AuthController {

  @Post('client/auth/login')
  async clientLogin(@Body() body: LoginDto, @Req() request: SessionRequest, @Res({ passthrough: true }) response: CookieResponse) {
-    return this.finishLogin(await this.auth.login(body, 'client'), request, response);
+    let result: Awaited<ReturnType<AuthService['login']>>;
+    try {
+      result = await this.auth.login(body, 'client');
+    } catch (error) {
+      await this.recordLoginFailure('client_login_failure', body.login, request).catch(() => undefined);
+      throw error;
+    }
+    return this.finishLogin(result, request, response);
  }

  @Get(['admin/auth/session', 'client/auth/session'])
@@ -121,6 +137,17 @@ export class AuthController {
    return publicResult;
  }

+  private recordLoginFailure(ruleCode: 'admin_login_failure' | 'client_login_failure', account: string, request: SessionRequest) {
+    return this.security.recordEvent({
+      ruleCode,
+      sourceIp: requestContext.getStore()?.ipAddress ?? '127.0.0.1',
+      account,
+      protocol: 'http',
+      path: ruleCode === 'admin_login_failure' ? '/admin/auth/login' : '/client/auth/login',
+      evidence: { userAgent: request.header('user-agent')?.slice(0, 256) },
+    });
+  }
+
  private writeLog(request: SessionRequest, action: string, detail: Record<string, unknown>) {
    return this.prisma.operationLog.create({
      data: { userId: request.sessionUserId, action, resource: 'auth_session', userAgent: request.header('user-agent'), detail: JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(detail)) as Prisma.InputJsonValue },
@@ -5,9 +5,10 @@ import { AuthController } from './auth.controller';
 import { AuthService } from './auth.service';
 import { RecentAuthenticationGuard } from './recent-authentication.guard';
 import { SessionService } from './session.service';
+import { SecurityDetectionModule } from '../security-detection/security-detection.module';

@Module({
-  imports: [UsersModule],
+  imports: [UsersModule, SecurityDetectionModule],
  controllers: [AuthController],
  providers: [
    AuthService,
@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ export class RequestContextMiddleware implements NestMiddleware {
  use(request: RequestLike, _response: unknown, next: () => void) {
    const forwarded = request.headers['x-forwarded-for'];
    const firstForwarded = Array.isArray(forwarded) ? forwarded[0] : forwarded?.split(',')[0];
-    const ipAddress = (firstForwarded ?? request.socket?.remoteAddress)?.trim().replace(/^::ffff:/, '');
+    const remoteAddress = request.socket?.remoteAddress?.trim().replace(/^::ffff:/, '');
+    const trustedProxies = new Set((process.env.TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS ?? '127.0.0.1,::1').split(',').map((item) => item.trim()).filter(Boolean));
+    // 仅可信反向代理可以声明客户端地址，防止攻击者伪造 X-Forwarded-For 绕过保护名单或嫁祸他人。
+    const ipAddress = (remoteAddress && trustedProxies.has(remoteAddress) ? firstForwarded : remoteAddress)?.trim().replace(/^::ffff:/, '');
    requestContext.run({ ipAddress }, next);
  }
 }
@@ -5,12 +5,13 @@ import IORedis from 'ioredis';
 import { PrismaService } from '../prisma/prisma.service';
 import { decryptSecret } from './open-api.crypto';
 import type { OpenApiRequestLike } from './open-api.types';
+import { SecurityDetectionService } from '../security-detection/security-detection.service';

@Injectable()
 export class OpenApiAuthGuard implements CanActivate, OnModuleDestroy {
  private redis?: IORedis;

-  constructor(private readonly prisma: PrismaService) {}
+  constructor(private readonly prisma: PrismaService, private readonly security: SecurityDetectionService) {}

  async canActivate(context: ExecutionContext) {
    const request = context.switchToHttp().getRequest<OpenApiRequestLike>();
@@ -19,9 +20,11 @@ export class OpenApiAuthGuard implements CanActivate, OnModuleDestroy {
    const nonce = header(request, 'x-nonce');
    const suppliedSignature = header(request, 'x-signature')?.replace(/^sha256=/i, '');
    if (!accessKey || !timestampText || !nonce || !suppliedSignature) {
+      await this.recordFailure('http_signature_failure', request, undefined, 'AUTH_HEADERS_MISSING');
      throw new UnauthorizedException({ code: 'AUTH_HEADERS_MISSING', message: '缺少HTTP接口鉴权请求头' });
    }
    if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,128}$/.test(nonce)) {
+      await this.recordFailure('http_signature_failure', request, accessKey, 'NONCE_INVALID');
      throw new UnauthorizedException({ code: 'NONCE_INVALID', message: 'X-Nonce 格式非法' });
    }
    const credential = await this.prisma.httpApiCredential.findUnique({
@@ -29,6 +32,7 @@ export class OpenApiAuthGuard implements CanActivate, OnModuleDestroy {
      include: { application: { include: { httpConfig: true, httpIpAllowlist: true } } },
    });
    if (!credential || credential.status !== 'active' || (credential.expiresAt && credential.expiresAt <= new Date())) {
+      await this.recordFailure('http_invalid_api_key', request, accessKey, 'CREDENTIAL_INVALID');
      throw new UnauthorizedException({ code: 'CREDENTIAL_INVALID', message: '访问凭据无效或已失效' });
    }
    const config = credential.application.httpConfig;
@@ -37,6 +41,7 @@ export class OpenApiAuthGuard implements CanActivate, OnModuleDestroy {
    }
    const timestamp = Number(timestampText);
    if (!Number.isFinite(timestamp) || Math.abs(Date.now() - timestamp * 1000) > config.timestampToleranceSeconds * 1000) {
+      await this.recordFailure('http_signature_failure', request, accessKey, 'TIMESTAMP_EXPIRED');
      throw new UnauthorizedException({ code: 'TIMESTAMP_EXPIRED', message: '请求时间戳已过期' });
    }
    const sourceIp = requestIp(request);
@@ -50,11 +55,13 @@ export class OpenApiAuthGuard implements CanActivate, OnModuleDestroy {
    const expectedBuffer = Buffer.from(expected, 'hex');
    const suppliedBuffer = /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/i.test(suppliedSignature) ? Buffer.from(suppliedSignature, 'hex') : Buffer.alloc(0);
    if (expectedBuffer.length !== suppliedBuffer.length || !timingSafeEqual(expectedBuffer, suppliedBuffer)) {
+      await this.recordFailure('http_signature_failure', request, accessKey, 'SIGNATURE_INVALID');
      throw new UnauthorizedException({ code: 'SIGNATURE_INVALID', message: '请求签名校验失败' });
    }
    const redis = this.getRedis();
    const nonceAccepted = await redis.set(`openapi:nonce:${credential.id}:${nonce}`, '1', 'EX', config.timestampToleranceSeconds * 2, 'NX');
    if (nonceAccepted !== 'OK') {
+      await this.recordFailure('http_replay_attempt', request, accessKey, 'NONCE_REPLAYED');
      throw new UnauthorizedException({ code: 'NONCE_REPLAYED', message: 'X-Nonce 已使用' });
    }
    const second = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
@@ -81,6 +88,13 @@ export class OpenApiAuthGuard implements CanActivate, OnModuleDestroy {
    this.redis ??= new IORedis(process.env.REDIS_URL ?? 'redis://127.0.0.1:6379', { maxRetriesPerRequest: 1 });
    return this.redis;
  }
+
+  private async recordFailure(ruleCode: 'http_invalid_api_key' | 'http_signature_failure' | 'http_replay_attempt', request: OpenApiRequestLike, account: string | undefined, resultCode: string) {
+    const sourceIp = requestIp(request);
+    if (!sourceIp) return;
+    // 检测记录失败不能改变原鉴权响应，避免安全辅助链路放大为业务可用性事故。
+    await this.security.recordEvent({ ruleCode, sourceIp, account, resultCode, protocol: 'http', path: (request.originalUrl ?? request.url ?? '').split('?')[0] }).catch(() => undefined);
+  }
 }

 function header(request: OpenApiRequestLike, name: string) {
@@ -90,7 +104,9 @@ function header(request: OpenApiRequestLike, name: string) {

 function requestIp(request: OpenApiRequestLike) {
  const forwarded = header(request, 'x-forwarded-for')?.split(',')[0]?.trim();
-  return (forwarded ?? request.socket?.remoteAddress)?.replace(/^::ffff:/, '');
+  const remoteAddress = request.socket?.remoteAddress?.replace(/^::ffff:/, '');
+  const trustedProxies = new Set((process.env.TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS ?? '127.0.0.1,::1').split(',').map((item) => item.trim()).filter(Boolean));
+  return (remoteAddress && trustedProxies.has(remoteAddress) ? forwarded : remoteAddress)?.replace(/^::ffff:/, '');
 }

 function ipMatches(ip: string, rule: string) {
@@ -6,9 +6,10 @@ import { ClientOpenApiController } from './client-open-api.controller';
 import { OpenApiAuthGuard } from './open-api-auth.guard';
 import { OpenApiController } from './open-api.controller';
 import { OpenApiService } from './open-api.service';
+import { SecurityDetectionModule } from '../security-detection/security-detection.module';

@Module({
-  imports: [PrismaModule, forwardRef(() => SendChainModule)],
+  imports: [PrismaModule, forwardRef(() => SendChainModule), SecurityDetectionModule],
  controllers: [OpenApiController, AdminOpenApiController, ClientOpenApiController],
  providers: [OpenApiService, OpenApiAuthGuard],
  exports: [OpenApiService],
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+import { Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { ConfigService } from '@nestjs/config';
+import { createConnection } from 'node:net';
+
+type AgentResponse = { ok: boolean; reference?: string; blocked?: boolean; active?: boolean; error?: string };
+
+@Injectable()
+export class SecurityAgentClient {
+  constructor(private readonly config: ConfigService) {}
+
+  block(input: { operationKey: string; sourceIp: string; executor: string; durationSeconds: number }) {
+    return this.call({ action: 'block', ...input });
+  }
+
+  unblock(input: { operationKey: string; sourceIp: string; executor: string }) {
+    return this.call({ action: 'unblock', ...input });
+  }
+
+  status(sourceIp?: string, executor?: string) {
+    return this.call({ action: 'status', sourceIp, executor });
+  }
+
+  applyRules(version: number, rules: Array<Record<string, unknown>>) {
+    return this.call({ action: 'apply_rules', version, rules });
+  }
+
+  private call(payload: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<AgentResponse> {
+    const socketPath = this.config.get<string>('SECURITY_AGENT_SOCKET') ?? '/run/cmpp-security-agent/agent.sock';
+    const timeoutMs = Number(this.config.get<string>('SECURITY_AGENT_TIMEOUT_MS') ?? 3000);
+    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+      const socket = createConnection(socketPath);
+      let settled = false;
+      let response = '';
+      const finish = (error?: Error) => {
+        if (settled) return;
+        settled = true;
+        socket.destroy();
+        if (error) reject(error);
+      };
+      socket.setTimeout(timeoutMs, () => finish(new Error('安全执行代理响应超时')));
+      socket.on('error', (error) => finish(new Error(`安全执行代理不可用: ${error.message}`)));
+      socket.on('connect', () => socket.write(`${JSON.stringify(payload)}\n`));
+      socket.on('data', (chunk) => {
+        response += chunk.toString('utf8');
+        const lineEnd = response.indexOf('\n');
+        if (lineEnd < 0) return;
+        try {
+          const parsed = JSON.parse(response.slice(0, lineEnd)) as AgentResponse;
+          settled = true;
+          socket.end();
+          resolve(parsed);
+        } catch {
+          finish(new Error('安全执行代理返回了非法响应'));
+        }
+      });
+    });
+  }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+export const SECURITY_RULE_CODES = [
+  'admin_login_failure', 'client_login_failure', 'ssh_auth_failure', 'cmpp_auth_failure',
+  'cmpp_protocol_abuse', 'http_invalid_api_key', 'http_signature_failure',
+  'http_replay_attempt', 'http_malicious_scan',
+] as const;
+
+export type SecurityRuleCode = typeof SECURITY_RULE_CODES[number];
+export const SECURITY_RULE_CODE_SET = new Set<string>(SECURITY_RULE_CODES);
+export const SECURITY_SEVERITIES = new Set(['low', 'medium', 'high', 'critical']);
+export const SECURITY_BLOCK_DURATIONS = new Set([600, 3600, 86400, 604800]);
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+import { Body, Controller, Get, Param, Post, Put, Query } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { ApiTags } from '@nestjs/swagger';
+import { CurrentSessionUserId } from '../auth/current-session-user.decorator';
+import { RequireRecentAuthentication } from '../auth/require-recent-authentication.decorator';
+import { SecurityDetectionService } from './security-detection.service';
+
+@ApiTags('security-detection')
+@Controller('admin/security-detection')
+export class SecurityDetectionController {
+  constructor(private readonly security: SecurityDetectionService) {}
+  @Get('overview') overview(@Query('range') range?: string) { return this.security.overview(range); }
+  @Get('alerts') alerts(@Query() query: Record<string, string>) { return this.security.listAlerts(query); }
+  @Get('rules') rules() { return this.security.listRules(); }
+  @Put('rules/:id') @RequireRecentAuthentication() updateRule(@Param('id') id: string, @Body() body: Record<string, unknown>, @CurrentSessionUserId() userId: string) { return this.security.updateRule(id, body, userId); }
+  @Post('alerts/:id/block') @RequireRecentAuthentication() block(@Param('id') id: string, @Body() body: { durationSeconds?: number; reason?: string }, @CurrentSessionUserId() userId: string) { return this.security.block(id, body, userId); }
+  @Post('alerts/:id/ignore') @RequireRecentAuthentication() ignore(@Param('id') id: string, @Body('reason') reason: string, @CurrentSessionUserId() userId: string) { return this.security.ignore(id, reason ?? '', userId); }
+  @Get('blocks') blocks() { return this.security.listBlocks(); }
+  @Post('blocks/:id/unblock') @RequireRecentAuthentication() unblock(@Param('id') id: string, @Body('reason') reason: string, @CurrentSessionUserId() userId: string) { return this.security.unblock(id, reason ?? '', userId); }
+  @Get('protected-networks') protectedNetworks() { return this.security.listProtectedNetworks(); }
+  @Post('protected-networks') @RequireRecentAuthentication() addProtectedNetwork(@Body() body: { network?: string; name?: string; reason?: string }, @CurrentSessionUserId() userId: string) { return this.security.addProtectedNetwork(body, userId); }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+import { Module } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { SecurityAgentClient } from './security-agent.client';
+import { SecurityDetectionController } from './security-detection.controller';
+import { SecurityEventController } from './security-event.controller';
+import { SecurityDetectionService } from './security-detection.service';
+
+@Module({ controllers: [SecurityDetectionController, SecurityEventController], providers: [SecurityAgentClient, SecurityDetectionService], exports: [SecurityDetectionService] })
+export class SecurityDetectionModule {}
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+import { ConflictException } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { SecurityDetectionService } from './security-detection.service';
+
+function createPrisma() {
+  const tx = {
+    $executeRaw: jest.fn(),
+    securityDetectionEvent: { create: jest.fn(), count: jest.fn() },
+    securityAlert: { findFirst: jest.fn(), create: jest.fn(), update: jest.fn(), updateMany: jest.fn() },
+    securityBlock: { create: jest.fn(), update: jest.fn() },
+  };
+  const prisma = {
+    securityDetectionRule: { findUnique: jest.fn(), findMany: jest.fn() },
+    securityDetectionEvent: { count: jest.fn() },
+    securityAlert: { findUnique: jest.fn(), update: jest.fn() },
+    securityBlock: { create: jest.fn(), update: jest.fn() },
+    securityProtectedNetwork: { findMany: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue([]) },
+    operationLog: { create: jest.fn() },
+    $transaction: jest.fn(async (value: unknown) => typeof value === 'function' ? value(tx) : Promise.all(value as Promise<unknown>[])),
+  };
+  return { prisma, tx };
+}
+
+describe('SecurityDetectionService', () => {
+  it('keeps a below-threshold event without creating a false alert', async () => {
+    const { prisma, tx } = createPrisma();
+    prisma.securityDetectionRule.findUnique.mockResolvedValue({ id: 'rule-1', enabled: true, threshold: 3, windowSeconds: 60, cooldownSeconds: 60, severity: 'high' });
+    tx.securityDetectionEvent.create.mockResolvedValue({ id: 'event-1' });
+    tx.securityDetectionEvent.count.mockResolvedValue(2);
+    const service = new SecurityDetectionService(prisma as never, {} as never);
+
+    await expect(service.recordEvent({ eventKey: 'event-key-1', ruleCode: 'http_signature_failure', sourceIp: '203.0.113.5' })).resolves.toEqual({ accepted: true, duplicate: false, alertId: null });
+    expect(tx.securityAlert.create).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('refuses built-in protected addresses before calling the privileged agent', async () => {
+    const { prisma } = createPrisma();
+    prisma.securityAlert.findUnique.mockResolvedValue({
+      id: 'alert-1', sourceIp: '127.0.0.1', status: 'open',
+      rule: { code: 'ssh_auth_failure', defaultBlockSeconds: 600, maximumBlockSeconds: 604800 },
+    });
+    const agent = { block: jest.fn(), status: jest.fn() };
+    const service = new SecurityDetectionService(prisma as never, agent as never);
+
+    await expect(service.block('alert-1', { durationSeconds: 600, reason: '隔离测试封禁' }, 'operator-1')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
+    expect(agent.block).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('maps an admin-login alert to nginx and marks blocked only after readback', async () => {
+    const { prisma, tx } = createPrisma();
+    prisma.securityAlert.findUnique.mockResolvedValue({
+      id: 'alert-1', sourceIp: '203.0.113.8', status: 'open',
+      rule: { code: 'admin_login_failure', defaultBlockSeconds: 600, maximumBlockSeconds: 604800 },
+    });
+    tx.securityAlert.updateMany.mockResolvedValue({ count: 1 });
+    tx.securityBlock.create.mockResolvedValue({ id: 'block-1' });
+    tx.securityBlock.update.mockResolvedValue({ id: 'block-1', status: 'blocked' });
+    tx.securityAlert.update.mockResolvedValue({ id: 'alert-1', status: 'blocked' });
+    const agent = { block: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ ok: true, reference: 'op-1' }), status: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ ok: true, blocked: true }) };
+    const service = new SecurityDetectionService(prisma as never, agent as never);
+
+    await expect(service.block('alert-1', { durationSeconds: 600, reason: '确认恶意登录扫描' }, 'operator-1')).resolves.toEqual(expect.objectContaining({ status: 'blocked' }));
+    expect(agent.block).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ executor: 'nginx_real_ip', sourceIp: '203.0.113.8' }));
+    expect(agent.status).toHaveBeenCalledWith('203.0.113.8', 'nginx_real_ip');
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+import { BadRequestException, ConflictException, Injectable, NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { createHash, randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
+import { isIP } from 'node:net';
+import { Prisma } from '@prisma/client';
+import { PrismaService } from '../prisma/prisma.service';
+import { SecurityAgentClient } from './security-agent.client';
+import { SECURITY_BLOCK_DURATIONS, SECURITY_RULE_CODE_SET, SECURITY_SEVERITIES, type SecurityRuleCode } from './security-detection.constants';
+
+export type SecurityEventInput = {
+  eventKey?: string; ruleCode: SecurityRuleCode; sourceIp: string; sourcePort?: number;
+  account?: string; path?: string; protocol?: string; resultCode?: string;
+  evidence?: Record<string, unknown>; occurredAt?: string | Date;
+};
+
+@Injectable()
+export class SecurityDetectionService {
+  constructor(private readonly prisma: PrismaService, private readonly agent: SecurityAgentClient) {}
+
+  async recordEvent(input: SecurityEventInput) {
+    if (!SECURITY_RULE_CODE_SET.has(input.ruleCode)) throw new BadRequestException('不支持的安全检测类型');
+    const sourceIp = normalizeIp(input.sourceIp);
+    const occurredAt = input.occurredAt ? new Date(input.occurredAt) : new Date();
+    if (!Number.isFinite(occurredAt.getTime())) throw new BadRequestException('安全事件时间无效');
+    const eventKey = input.eventKey ?? createHash('sha256').update(JSON.stringify([
+      input.ruleCode, sourceIp, input.sourcePort, input.account, input.path, input.resultCode,
+      occurredAt.toISOString(), input.evidence,
+    ])).digest('hex');
+    const rule = await this.prisma.securityDetectionRule.findUnique({ where: { code: input.ruleCode } });
+    if (!rule) throw new NotFoundException('安全检测规则不存在');
+
+    return this.prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
+      // 同一来源和规则串行聚合，避免并发计数跨过阈值时创建多个告警。
+      await tx.$executeRaw`SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtext(${`${rule.id}:${sourceIp}`}))`;
+      try {
+        await tx.securityDetectionEvent.create({ data: {
+          eventKey, ruleId: rule.id, sourceIp, sourcePort: input.sourcePort,
+          accountHash: input.account ? createHash('sha256').update(input.account).digest('hex') : undefined,
+          path: input.path?.slice(0, 512), protocol: input.protocol?.slice(0, 32), resultCode: input.resultCode?.slice(0, 128),
+          evidence: sanitizeEvidence(input.evidence), occurredAt,
+        } });
+      } catch (error) {
+        if (isUniqueViolation(error)) return { accepted: true, duplicate: true, alertId: null };
+        throw error;
+      }
+      if (!rule.enabled) return { accepted: true, duplicate: false, alertId: null };
+
+      const windowStartedAt = new Date(occurredAt.getTime() - rule.windowSeconds * 1000);
+      const storedEventCount = await tx.securityDetectionEvent.count({
+        where: { ruleId: rule.id, sourceIp, occurredAt: { gte: windowStartedAt, lte: occurredAt } },
+      });
+      // Fail2ban上报代表其自身窗口已经达到maxretry；应用事件则逐条在数据库窗口内计数。
+      const eventCount = rule.sourceType === 'fail2ban' ? Math.max(storedEventCount, rule.threshold) : storedEventCount;
+      if (eventCount < rule.threshold) return { accepted: true, duplicate: false, alertId: null };
+
+      const cooldownStart = new Date(occurredAt.getTime() - rule.cooldownSeconds * 1000);
+      const active = await tx.securityAlert.findFirst({
+        where: { ruleId: rule.id, sourceIp, status: { in: ['open', 'acknowledged', 'block_failed', 'blocked'] }, lastOccurredAt: { gte: cooldownStart } },
+        orderBy: { lastOccurredAt: 'desc' },
+      });
+      if (active) {
+        const updated = await tx.securityAlert.update({ where: { id: active.id }, data: { eventCount, lastOccurredAt: occurredAt } });
+        return { accepted: true, duplicate: false, alertId: updated.id };
+      }
+      const fingerprint = createHash('sha256').update(`${rule.id}:${sourceIp}:${occurredAt.toISOString()}`).digest('hex');
+      const alert = await tx.securityAlert.create({ data: {
+        fingerprint, ruleId: rule.id, sourceIp, severity: rule.severity, eventCount,
+        windowStartedAt, firstOccurredAt: occurredAt, lastOccurredAt: occurredAt,
+      } });
+      return { accepted: true, duplicate: false, alertId: alert.id };
+    }, { isolationLevel: Prisma.TransactionIsolationLevel.ReadCommitted });
+  }
+
+  async overview(range = '24h') {
+    if (!['1h', '24h', '7d'].includes(range)) throw new BadRequestException('仅支持1h、24h或7d安全检测范围');
+    const hours = range === '1h' ? 1 : range === '7d' ? 168 : 24;
+    const since = new Date(Date.now() - hours * 3600_000);
+    const activeStatuses = ['open', 'acknowledged', 'block_failed'];
+    const [alerts, totalEvents, activeBlocks, rules, activeAlerts, criticalAlerts, distribution, agentStatus] = await Promise.all([
+      this.prisma.securityAlert.findMany({ where: { lastOccurredAt: { gte: since } }, include: { rule: true }, orderBy: { lastOccurredAt: 'desc' }, take: 12 }),
+      this.prisma.securityDetectionEvent.count({ where: { occurredAt: { gte: since } } }),
+      this.prisma.securityBlock.count({ where: { status: 'blocked', expiresAt: { gt: new Date() } } }),
+      this.prisma.securityDetectionRule.findMany({ orderBy: { name: 'asc' } }),
+      this.prisma.securityAlert.count({ where: { status: { in: activeStatuses } } }),
+      this.prisma.securityAlert.count({ where: { status: { in: activeStatuses }, severity: 'critical' } }),
+      this.prisma.securityAlert.groupBy({ by: ['ruleId'], where: { lastOccurredAt: { gte: since } }, _sum: { eventCount: true } }),
+      this.agent.status().catch((error: Error) => ({ ok: false, active: false, error: error.message })),
+    ]);
+    const ruleNames = new Map(rules.map((rule) => [rule.id, rule.name]));
+    return {
+      range, collectedAt: new Date().toISOString(), totalEvents, activeAlerts, criticalAlerts, activeBlocks,
+      health: { agent: agentStatus.ok && agentStatus.active ? 'healthy' : 'unavailable', agentError: agentStatus.error, rulesEffective: rules.filter((rule) => rule.applyStatus === 'effective').length, rulesTotal: rules.length },
+      sourceDistribution: distribution.map((item) => ({ name: ruleNames.get(item.ruleId) ?? item.ruleId, value: item._sum.eventCount ?? 0 })),
+      alerts,
+    };
+  }
+
+  listAlerts(query: { status?: string; ruleCode?: string; sourceIp?: string; page?: string; pageSize?: string }) {
+    const page = positiveInt(query.page, 1, 100000);
+    const pageSize = positiveInt(query.pageSize, 20, 100);
+    const where: Prisma.SecurityAlertWhereInput = {
+      ...(query.status ? { status: query.status } : {}),
+      ...(query.ruleCode ? { rule: { code: query.ruleCode } } : {}),
+      ...(query.sourceIp ? { sourceIp: normalizeIp(query.sourceIp) } : {}),
+    };
+    return Promise.all([
+      this.prisma.securityAlert.findMany({ where, include: { rule: true }, orderBy: { lastOccurredAt: 'desc' }, skip: (page - 1) * pageSize, take: pageSize }),
+      this.prisma.securityAlert.count({ where }),
+    ]).then(([items, total]) => ({ items, total, page, pageSize }));
+  }
+
+  listRules() { return this.prisma.securityDetectionRule.findMany({ orderBy: [{ sourceType: 'asc' }, { name: 'asc' }] }); }
+
+  async updateRule(id: string, input: Record<string, unknown>, operatorId: string) {
+    assertAllowedKeys(input, ['configVersion', 'enabled', 'threshold', 'windowSeconds', 'cooldownSeconds', 'severity', 'defaultBlockSeconds', 'maximumBlockSeconds']);
+    if (typeof input.enabled !== 'boolean') throw new BadRequestException('启用状态必须为布尔值');
+    const current = await this.prisma.securityDetectionRule.findUnique({ where: { id } });
+    if (!current) throw new NotFoundException('规则不存在');
+    if (Number(input.configVersion) !== current.configVersion) throw new ConflictException('规则已被其他管理员修改，请刷新后重试');
+    const threshold = boundedInt(input.threshold, 1, 100000, '触发次数');
+    const windowSeconds = boundedInt(input.windowSeconds, 10, 86400, '检测窗口');
+    const cooldownSeconds = boundedInt(input.cooldownSeconds, 0, 604800, '告警冷却');
+    const defaultBlockSeconds = boundedInt(input.defaultBlockSeconds, 600, 604800, '默认封禁时长');
+    const maximumBlockSeconds = boundedInt(input.maximumBlockSeconds, defaultBlockSeconds, 604800, '最大封禁时长');
+    const severity = String(input.severity ?? '');
+    if (!SECURITY_SEVERITIES.has(severity)) throw new BadRequestException('告警级别无效');
+    const version = current.configVersion + 1;
+    const nextConfig = { enabled: Boolean(input.enabled), threshold, windowSeconds, cooldownSeconds, severity, defaultBlockSeconds, maximumBlockSeconds };
+    await this.prisma.securityDetectionRule.update({ where: { id }, data: {
+      configVersion: version, applyStatus: 'applying', lastApplyError: null, pendingConfig: nextConfig,
+    } });
+    await this.prisma.operationLog.create({ data: { userId: operatorId, action: 'security.rule_updated', resource: 'security_detection_rule', resourceId: id, detail: { version, beforeVersion: current.configVersion } } });
+    try {
+      const response = await this.agent.applyRules(version, (await this.listRules()).map((rule) => rule.id === id
+        ? { code: rule.code, enabled: nextConfig.enabled, threshold: nextConfig.threshold, windowSeconds: nextConfig.windowSeconds, cooldownSeconds: nextConfig.cooldownSeconds }
+        : { code: rule.code, enabled: rule.enabled, threshold: rule.threshold, windowSeconds: rule.windowSeconds, cooldownSeconds: rule.cooldownSeconds }));
+      if (!response.ok) throw new Error(response.error ?? '安全代理拒绝应用规则');
+      return this.prisma.securityDetectionRule.update({ where: { id }, data: { ...nextConfig, effectiveVersion: version, applyStatus: 'effective', pendingConfig: Prisma.JsonNull } });
+    } catch (error) {
+      const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : '规则应用失败';
+      await this.prisma.securityDetectionRule.update({ where: { id }, data: { applyStatus: 'failed', lastApplyError: message } });
+      throw new ConflictException({ code: 'SECURITY_RULE_APPLY_FAILED', message });
+    }
+  }
+
+  async block(alertId: string, input: { durationSeconds?: number; reason?: string }, operatorId: string) {
+    assertAllowedKeys(input as Record<string, unknown>, ['durationSeconds', 'reason']);
+    const alert = await this.prisma.securityAlert.findUnique({ where: { id: alertId }, include: { rule: true } });
+    if (!alert) throw new NotFoundException('告警不存在');
+    if (!['open', 'acknowledged', 'block_failed'].includes(alert.status)) throw new ConflictException('该告警当前不可封禁');
+    const durationSeconds = Number(input.durationSeconds ?? alert.rule.defaultBlockSeconds);
+    if (!SECURITY_BLOCK_DURATIONS.has(durationSeconds) || durationSeconds > alert.rule.maximumBlockSeconds) throw new BadRequestException('封禁时长不在允许范围内');
+    const reason = String(input.reason ?? '').trim();
+    if (reason.length < 5 || reason.length > 500) throw new BadRequestException('封禁原因需为5至500个字符');
+    if (isSystemProtected(alert.sourceIp) || await this.isProtected(alert.sourceIp)) throw new ConflictException({ code: 'PROTECTED_NETWORK', message: '该地址属于系统或人工保护名单，禁止封禁' });
+    // 执行器由可信的规则入口固定映射，绝不接受浏览器指定，避免把Cloudflare访客IP错误交给nftables。
+    const executor = ['admin_login_failure', 'client_login_failure'].includes(alert.rule.code) ? 'nginx_real_ip' : 'nftables';
+    const operationKey = randomUUID();
+    const block = await this.prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
+      const claimed = await tx.securityAlert.updateMany({ where: { id: alert.id, status: { in: ['open', 'acknowledged', 'block_failed'] } }, data: { status: 'block_requested' } });
+      if (!claimed.count) throw new ConflictException('告警已由其他管理员处理，请刷新后重试');
+      return tx.securityBlock.create({ data: { operationKey, alertId, sourceIp: alert.sourceIp, executor, durationSeconds, reason, requestedById: operatorId } });
+    });
+    await this.prisma.operationLog.create({ data: { userId: operatorId, action: 'security.block_requested', resource: 'security_block', resourceId: block.id, detail: { alertId, sourceIp: alert.sourceIp, executor, durationSeconds, reason } } });
+    try {
+      const applied = await this.agent.block({ operationKey, sourceIp: alert.sourceIp, executor, durationSeconds });
+      if (!applied.ok) throw new Error(applied.error ?? '安全代理拒绝封禁');
+      const readback = await this.agent.status(alert.sourceIp, executor);
+      if (!readback.ok || !readback.blocked) throw new Error(readback.error ?? '执行后未读到真实封禁状态');
+      const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + durationSeconds * 1000);
+      const result = await this.prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
+        const updated = await tx.securityBlock.update({ where: { id: block.id }, data: { status: 'blocked', appliedAt: new Date(), expiresAt, executorReference: applied.reference } });
+        await tx.securityAlert.update({ where: { id: alert.id }, data: { status: 'blocked', blockId: block.id } });
+        return updated;
+      });
+      return result;
+    } catch (error) {
+      const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : '封禁执行失败';
+      await this.prisma.$transaction([
+        this.prisma.securityBlock.update({ where: { id: block.id }, data: { status: 'failed', lastError: message } }),
+        this.prisma.securityAlert.update({ where: { id: alert.id }, data: { status: 'block_failed' } }),
+      ]);
+      throw new ConflictException({ code: 'SECURITY_BLOCK_FAILED', message });
+    }
+  }
+
+  async ignore(alertId: string, reason: string, operatorId: string) {
+    if (reason.trim().length < 5) throw new BadRequestException('忽略原因至少5个字符');
+    const updated = await this.prisma.securityAlert.updateMany({ where: { id: alertId, status: { in: ['open', 'acknowledged', 'block_failed'] } }, data: { status: 'ignored', ignoredAt: new Date(), ignoredById: operatorId, ignoreReason: reason.trim() } });
+    if (!updated.count) throw new ConflictException('告警状态已变化，请刷新后重试');
+    await this.prisma.operationLog.create({ data: { userId: operatorId, action: 'security.alert_ignored', resource: 'security_alert', resourceId: alertId, detail: { reason: reason.trim() } } });
+    return { success: true };
+  }
+
+  listBlocks() { return this.prisma.securityBlock.findMany({ orderBy: { requestedAt: 'desc' }, take: 200 }); }
+
+  async unblock(blockId: string, reason: string, operatorId: string) {
+    if (reason.trim().length < 5) throw new BadRequestException('解封原因至少5个字符');
+    const block = await this.prisma.securityBlock.findUnique({ where: { id: blockId } });
+    if (!block) throw new NotFoundException('封禁记录不存在');
+    if (block.status !== 'blocked') throw new ConflictException('该记录当前不可解封');
+    const claimed = await this.prisma.securityBlock.updateMany({ where: { id: blockId, status: 'blocked' }, data: { status: 'unblock_requested' } });
+    if (!claimed.count) throw new ConflictException('封禁状态已变化，请刷新后重试');
+    try {
+      const result = await this.agent.unblock({ operationKey: randomUUID(), sourceIp: block.sourceIp, executor: block.executor });
+      if (!result.ok) throw new Error(result.error ?? '安全代理拒绝解封');
+      const readback = await this.agent.status(block.sourceIp, block.executor);
+      if (!readback.ok || readback.blocked) throw new Error(readback.error ?? '执行后仍读到封禁规则');
+      const updated = await this.prisma.securityBlock.update({ where: { id: block.id }, data: { status: 'released', releasedAt: new Date(), releasedById: operatorId } });
+      if (block.alertId) await this.prisma.securityAlert.updateMany({ where: { id: block.alertId, blockId: block.id }, data: { status: 'unblocked' } });
+      await this.prisma.operationLog.create({ data: { userId: operatorId, action: 'security.block_released', resource: 'security_block', resourceId: block.id, detail: { sourceIp: block.sourceIp, executor: block.executor, reason: reason.trim() } } });
+      return updated;
+    } catch (error) {
+      const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : '解封失败';
+      await this.prisma.securityBlock.update({ where: { id: block.id }, data: { status: 'blocked', lastError: message } });
+      throw new ConflictException({ code: 'SECURITY_UNBLOCK_FAILED', message });
+    }
+  }
+  listProtectedNetworks() { return this.prisma.securityProtectedNetwork.findMany({ orderBy: { createdAt: 'desc' } }); }
+
+  async addProtectedNetwork(input: { network?: string; name?: string; reason?: string }, operatorId: string) {
+    const network = normalizeNetwork(String(input.network ?? ''));
+    if (!input.name?.trim() || !input.reason?.trim()) throw new BadRequestException('名称和保护原因不能为空');
+    const result = await this.prisma.securityProtectedNetwork.create({ data: { network, name: input.name.trim(), reason: input.reason.trim(), createdById: operatorId } });
+    await this.prisma.operationLog.create({ data: { userId: operatorId, action: 'security.protected_network_created', resource: 'security_protected_network', resourceId: result.id, detail: { network } } });
+    return result;
+  }
+
+  private async isProtected(ip: string) {
+    const entries = await this.prisma.securityProtectedNetwork.findMany({ where: { enabled: true }, select: { network: true } });
+    return entries.some((entry) => networkContains(entry.network, ip));
+  }
+}
+
+function normalizeIp(value: string) { const normalized = value?.trim().replace(/^::ffff:/, ''); if (!isIP(normalized)) throw new BadRequestException('来源IP无效'); return normalized; }
+function normalizeNetwork(value: string) { const [address, prefix] = value.trim().split('/'); const family = isIP(address); if (!family) throw new BadRequestException('保护网段无效'); if (prefix === undefined) return address; const bits = Number(prefix); const max = family === 4 ? 32 : 128; if (!Number.isInteger(bits) || bits < 0 || bits > max) throw new BadRequestException('保护网段前缀无效'); return `${address}/${bits}`; }
+function networkContains(network: string, ip: string) { const [address, prefixText] = network.split('/'); if (isIP(address) !== isIP(ip)) return false; if (prefixText === undefined) return address === ip; const bits = Number(prefixText); return (addressToBigInt(address) >> BigInt((isIP(address) === 4 ? 32 : 128) - bits)) === (addressToBigInt(ip) >> BigInt((isIP(ip) === 4 ? 32 : 128) - bits)); }
+function addressToBigInt(value: string) { if (isIP(value) === 4) return value.split('.').reduce((total, part) => (total << 8n) + BigInt(part), 0n); const [left, right = ''] = value.toLowerCase().split('::'); const leftParts = left ? left.split(':') : []; const rightParts = right ? right.split(':') : []; const parts = [...leftParts, ...Array(Math.max(0, 8 - leftParts.length - rightParts.length)).fill('0'), ...rightParts]; return parts.reduce((total, part) => (total << 16n) + BigInt(`0x${part || '0'}`), 0n); }
+function positiveInt(value: string | undefined, fallback: number, max: number) { const parsed = Number(value ?? fallback); return Number.isInteger(parsed) && parsed > 0 ? Math.min(parsed, max) : fallback; }
+function boundedInt(value: unknown, min: number, max: number, label: string) { const parsed = Number(value); if (!Number.isInteger(parsed) || parsed < min || parsed > max) throw new BadRequestException(`${label}必须在${min}至${max}之间`); return parsed; }
+function sanitizeEvidence(value?: Record<string, unknown>) { if (!value) return undefined; const sanitized = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(value, (key, item) => /password|secret|token|signature|access.?key/i.test(key) ? '[REDACTED]' : item)); return sanitized as Prisma.InputJsonValue; }
+function isUniqueViolation(error: unknown) { return error instanceof Prisma.PrismaClientKnownRequestError && error.code === 'P2002'; }
+function assertAllowedKeys(input: Record<string, unknown>, allowed: string[]) { const unknown = Object.keys(input).filter((key) => !allowed.includes(key)); if (unknown.length) throw new BadRequestException(`不支持的字段: ${unknown.join(', ')}`); }
+function isSystemProtected(ip: string) {
+  const builtIns = ['0.0.0.0/8', '10.0.0.0/8', '100.64.0.0/10', '127.0.0.0/8', '169.254.0.0/16', '172.16.0.0/12', '192.168.0.0/16', '224.0.0.0/4', '::/128', '::1/128', 'fc00::/7', 'fe80::/10', ...(process.env.SECURITY_BUILTIN_PROTECTED_NETWORKS ?? '').split(',').map((item) => item.trim()).filter(Boolean)];
+  return builtIns.some((network) => networkContains(network, ip));
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+import { UnauthorizedException } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { SecurityEventController } from './security-event.controller';
+
+describe('SecurityEventController', () => {
+  const security = { recordEvent: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ accepted: true }) };
+  const config = { get: jest.fn().mockReturnValue('internal-token-0123456789') };
+  const controller = new SecurityEventController(security as never, config as never);
+
+  beforeEach(() => jest.clearAllMocks());
+
+  it('rejects a public event injection without the internal token', () => {
+    expect(() => controller.record({ ruleCode: 'ssh_auth_failure', sourceIp: '203.0.113.9' }, undefined)).toThrow(UnauthorizedException);
+    expect(security.recordEvent).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a fixed event from an authenticated local producer', async () => {
+    await expect(controller.record({ ruleCode: 'ssh_auth_failure', sourceIp: '203.0.113.9' }, 'internal-token-0123456789')).resolves.toEqual({ accepted: true });
+    expect(security.recordEvent).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ ruleCode: 'ssh_auth_failure' }));
+  });
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+import { Body, Controller, Headers, Post, UnauthorizedException } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { ConfigService } from '@nestjs/config';
+import { timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
+import { ApiTags } from '@nestjs/swagger';
+import { SecurityDetectionService, type SecurityEventInput } from './security-detection.service';
+
+@ApiTags('gateway-security-events')
+@Controller('gateway/events/security-detection')
+export class SecurityEventController {
+  constructor(private readonly security: SecurityDetectionService, private readonly config: ConfigService) {}
+  @Post() record(@Body() body: SecurityEventInput, @Headers('x-security-event-token') supplied?: string) {
+    const expected = this.config.get<string>('SECURITY_EVENT_TOKEN');
+    if (!expected || !supplied || !safeEqual(expected, supplied)) throw new UnauthorizedException('安全事件来源认证失败');
+    return this.security.recordEvent(body);
+  }
+}
+
+function safeEqual(left: string, right: string) { const a = Buffer.from(left); const b = Buffer.from(right); return a.length === b.length && timingSafeEqual(a, b); }
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ describe('GatewayEventsController protocol logging', () => {
  const protocolLogs = {
    record: jest.fn(),
  };
-  const controller = new GatewayEventsController(sendChain as never, {} as never, protocolLogs as never);
+  const controller = new GatewayEventsController(sendChain as never, {} as never, protocolLogs as never, { recordEvent: jest.fn() } as never);

  beforeEach(() => {
    jest.clearAllMocks();
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import { SendChainService } from './send-chain.service';
 import { GatewayDownstreamConnectionEventDto } from '../sms-config/sms-config.contracts';
 import { SmsConfigService } from '../sms-config/sms-config.service';
 import { ProtocolLogsService, type ProtocolLogInput } from '../protocol-logs/protocol-logs.service';
+import { SecurityDetectionService } from '../security-detection/security-detection.service';

@ApiTags('gateway-events')
@Controller('gateway/events')
@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ export class GatewayEventsController {
    private readonly sendChain: SendChainService,
    private readonly smsConfig: SmsConfigService,
    private readonly protocolLogs: ProtocolLogsService,
+    private readonly security: SecurityDetectionService,
  ) {}

  @Post('submit-result')
@@ -81,8 +83,13 @@ export class GatewayEventsController {
  }

  @Post('inbound/authenticate')
-  authenticateInbound(@Body() body: GatewayInboundAuthDto) {
-    return this.trackGatewayEvent('connect', body, () => this.sendChain.authenticateInboundApplication(body), 'client_to_platform');
+  async authenticateInbound(@Body() body: GatewayInboundAuthDto) {
+    try {
+      return await this.trackGatewayEvent('connect', body, () => this.sendChain.authenticateInboundApplication(body), 'client_to_platform');
+    } catch (error) {
+      if (body.remoteIp) await this.security.recordEvent({ ruleCode: 'cmpp_auth_failure', sourceIp: body.remoteIp, account: body.account, protocol: body.version ?? 'cmpp', resultCode: error instanceof Error ? error.name : 'AUTH_FAILED' }).catch(() => undefined);
+      throw error;
+    }
  }

  @Post('inbound/submit')
@@ -9,9 +9,10 @@ import { AdminSendChainController } from './admin-send-chain.controller';
 import { ClientSendChainController } from './client-send-chain.controller';
 import { GatewayEventsController } from './gateway-events.controller';
 import { SendChainService } from './send-chain.service';
+import { SecurityDetectionModule } from '../security-detection/security-detection.module';

@Module({
-  imports: [PrismaModule, BillingModule, DictionariesModule, forwardRef(() => RiskReviewModule), SmsConfigModule, forwardRef(() => OpenApiModule)],
+  imports: [PrismaModule, BillingModule, DictionariesModule, forwardRef(() => RiskReviewModule), SmsConfigModule, forwardRef(() => OpenApiModule), SecurityDetectionModule],
  controllers: [AdminSendChainController, ClientSendChainController, GatewayEventsController],
  providers: [SendChainService],
  exports: [SendChainService],
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+[Definition]
+failregex = ^<HOST> .* "(?:GET|POST|HEAD) /(?:\.env|\.git|wp-admin|wp-login\.php|phpmyadmin|vendor/phpunit|actuator|cgi-bin)(?:[/? ][^\"]*)?" (?:400|403|404) .*$
+ignoreregex =
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+[Definition]
+# Detection remains report-only. The fixed action is installed by the deployment
+# script and can only forward Fail2ban's matched IP/jail values to the local collector.
+actionstart =
+actionstop =
+actioncheck =
+actionban = /opt/cmpp-platform/current/bin/cmpp-security-agent report <name> <ip>
+actionunban =
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=CMPP restricted security execution agent
+After=network.target fail2ban.service nftables.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=root
+Group=cmpp-security
+EnvironmentFile=/etc/cmpp-platform/cmpp-platform.env
+ExecStart=/opt/cmpp-platform/current/bin/cmpp-security-agent
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=3
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ReadWritePaths=/run/cmpp-security-agent /var/lib/cmpp-security-agent /etc/nginx/snippets /etc/fail2ban/jail.d
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_NETLINK
+CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE CAP_KILL
+AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
+LockPersonality=true
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1138,3 +1138,8 @@ global，不能错误归入client。`client-signature-*`、发送页、企业认
 ```

 每次开始新拆分版本时，在本路线图基础上另写该版本的短实施计划，不直接把路线图当作可执行变更清单。
+## 安全检测领域边界补充（2026-08-14）
+
+- `api/src/security-detection/` 是安全事件、聚合告警、规则版本和人工封禁编排的唯一业务边界；登录、OpenAPI 和 Gateway 只上报固定类型的结构化事件，不复制聚合或封禁逻辑。
+- `gateway/cmd/security-agent/` 是最小特权执行边界，不依赖 NestJS Service，不接受任意命令、路径、jail、action 或 shell 参数。该二进制与 `deploy/security/`、`tools/security/install-security-agent.sh` 作为同一发布单元评审。
+- 前端 `src/apps/admin/security-detection/` 通过 `src/api/admin/security-detection.api.ts` 访问稳定门面，不直接访问 Fail2ban、Nginx、nftables 或安全代理。
@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+# Fail2ban 安全检测与人工封禁平台设计方案
+
+> 版本：V1.0（需求评审稿）<br>
+> 日期：2026-08-14<br>
+> 范围：运营端自研 UI、安全检测、阈值配置、告警处置、人工封禁与解封<br>
+> 边界：第一版不自动封禁、不开放任意 Fail2ban/防火墙命令、不在线编辑正则表达式
+
+## 1. 建设目标
+
+在运营端“安全控制”下建设自研安全检测面板，统一接收 SSH、运营端登录、客户端登录、CMPP 入站和 HTTP API 的异常行为，按照可配置规则聚合为安全告警。平台管理员查看证据后，可人工执行固定时长封禁、解封、忽略或加入保护名单。
+
+第一版采用“检测与执行分离”原则：
+
+1. Fail2ban 和应用侧检测器只生成事件及告警，不自动修改防火墙。
+2. 人工点击“封禁”后，后端重新校验告警、真实 IP、保护名单、执行目标和操作权限。
+3. 只有受限安全代理可以执行系统级封禁；NestJS 不直接获得 root、通用 sudo 或任意 shell 能力。
+4. PostgreSQL 保存配置、事件、告警、封禁事实和操作审计；页面不得使用 mock、静态数据或 localStorage 伪造状态。
+
+## 2. 第一版范围
+
+### 2.1 检测类型
+
+| 规则编码 | 检测对象 | 事件来源 | 第一版默认建议值 | 默认风险 |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| `admin_login_failure` | 运营端账号登录失败 | NestJS 结构化安全事件 | 同一 IP 10 分钟 8 次 | 中 |
+| `client_login_failure` | 客户端账号登录失败 | NestJS 结构化安全事件 | 同一 IP 10 分钟 8 次 | 中 |
+| `ssh_auth_failure` | SSH 12022 认证失败 | journald + Fail2ban filter | 同一 IP 10 分钟 6 次 | 高 |
+| `cmpp_auth_failure` | CMPP 17890 未知账号、认证失败或不允许 IP | Gateway 结构化安全事件 | 同一 IP 5 分钟 5 次 | 高 |
+| `cmpp_protocol_abuse` | 非法协议包、异常版本或高频无效连接 | Gateway 结构化安全事件 | 同一 IP 1 分钟 20 次 | 高 |
+| `http_invalid_api_key` | HTTP API 错误或未知访问密钥 | NestJS HTTP API 鉴权事件 | 同一 IP 5 分钟 10 次 | 高 |
+| `http_signature_failure` | HTTP API 签名缺失、格式错误或验签失败 | NestJS HTTP API 验签事件 | 同一 IP 5 分钟 10 次 | 高 |
+| `http_replay_attempt` | nonce、时间戳或幂等凭证重放 | NestJS HTTP API 验签事件 | 同一 IP 10 分钟 3 次 | 严重 |
+| `http_malicious_scan` | 扫描敏感路径、跨路径高频 404、明显漏洞探测 | Nginx 结构化日志 + Fail2ban filter | 同一 IP 1 分钟 20 次且涉及至少 8 个不同路径 | 高 |
+
+表中数值只是首次安装默认值，必须保存到真实数据库并可在运营端配置。业务 400、正常参数校验失败、合法客户偶发时钟偏差、普通 404、供应商连接失败不得直接归类为攻击。
+
+### 2.2 处置能力
+
+- 查看检测总览、趋势、来源、风险等级、Top IP 和待处置告警。
+- 查看告警详情、脱敏日志证据、规则快照和历史处置。
+- 人工封禁固定时长：10 分钟、1 小时、24 小时、7 天。
+- 人工解封、忽略告警、加入保护名单。
+- 查看当前真实封禁、执行目标、到期时间和同步状态。
+- 配置检测规则阈值、时间窗口、冷却时间、风险等级和启停状态。
+- 查看 Fail2ban、事件采集器、安全代理、规则版本及封禁执行器健康状态。
+
+### 2.3 第一版不做
+
+- 自动封禁。
+- 永久封禁或前端输入任意封禁秒数。
+- 在线编辑 Fail2ban regex、日志路径、action、iptables/nftables 或 Nginx 配置文本。
+- 从页面执行任意 shell、`fail2ban-client`、`systemctl` 或防火墙命令。
+- 自动将外部威胁情报加入封禁。
+- 删除原始告警和处置历史。
+
+## 3. 总体架构
+
+```text
+sshd journal ── Fail2ban 检测 jail ─┐
+Nginx access/error ─ Fail2ban jail ─┤
+NestJS 登录/HTTP 鉴权安全事件 ──────┤
+Go Gateway CMPP 安全事件 ───────────┤
+                                     ↓
+                         Security Event Collector
+                                     ↓
+                     PostgreSQL 事件、规则、告警、封禁
+                                     ↓
+                           NestJS 运营端安全 API
+                                     ↓
+                              自研运营端 UI
+                                     ↓ 人工确认
+                        Root Security Agent (Unix Socket)
+                          ↓                    ↓
+                  nftables/manual jail   Nginx real-IP deny
+```
+
+### 3.1 组件职责
+
+#### Fail2ban
+
+- 读取 sshd 和 Nginx 等系统日志。
+- 使用固定、随版本发布的 filter 识别失败行为。
+- 根据已生效规则计算窗口与阈值。
+- 触发“告警事件 action”，但不直接封禁。
+- 不作为平台告警历史和真实封禁状态的唯一数据源。
+
+#### 应用侧安全事件
+
+NestJS 和 Gateway 对其掌握真实业务语义的事件直接产生结构化安全事件，避免只靠文本正则猜测：
+
+- 登录入口、失败类型和真实请求 IP。
+- HTTP API 密钥查找失败、签名失败、重放拒绝。
+- CMPP 账号、AuthenticatorSource 校验、IP 白名单和协议异常。
+
+任何安全事件不得记录明文密码、完整 API 密钥、签名密钥、AuthenticatorSource 或完整短信内容；账号、密钥标识只保存脱敏值或不可逆指纹。
+
+#### Security Event Collector
+
+- 通过受限 Unix Socket 或 root 写入、collector 只读的事件目录接收 Fail2ban 事件。
+- 校验事件版本、规则编码、IP、时间和来源。
+- 写入 PostgreSQL，并依据数据库规则做幂等聚合。
+- 维护最后事件时间、丢弃数量和解析失败指标。
+
+#### Root Security Agent
+
+- 独立于 NestJS，以最小 root 权限运行。
+- 仅监听本机 Unix Socket，不监听 TCP 公网端口。
+- 只接受固定 JSON 协议：`block`、`unblock`、`status`、`apply_rule_version`。
+- 对规则编码、执行器、IPv4/IPv6、时长和幂等键做白名单校验。
+- 使用无 shell 参数数组或原生库执行，不拼接命令。
+- 原子生成平台专属配置文件，校验后才 reload；失败保留旧版本。
+
+#### NestJS
+
+- 读取真实 PostgreSQL 告警和配置。
+- 执行 RBAC、近期重新认证、保护名单和状态校验。
+- 创建封禁操作记录并调用本地安全代理。
+- 根据代理回读结果确认真实封禁状态。
+- 不以 root 运行，不直接写 `/etc/fail2ban/*` 或防火墙。
+
+## 4. Cloudflare 与执行器选择
+
+恢复 `CF-Connecting-IP` 只能让 Nginx/应用识别访客真实 IP，并不会改变到达服务器的 TCP 源地址。对 `sms.lisglo.com` 的 Cloudflare 橙云流量，nftables 封禁访客真实 IP 无效，误封 Cloudflare 节点反而可能中断全站。
+
+第一版按入口固定执行器：
+
+| 入口 | 网络形态 | 检测 IP | 人工封禁执行器 |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| 运营端、客户端 | Cloudflare 橙云 | 经过可信 Cloudflare 网段恢复的真实 IP | Nginx real-IP deny；未来可扩展 Cloudflare API |
+| `api.lisglo.com` | 灰云直连 | TCP 源 IP | nftables/manual jail |
+| SSH 12022 | 公网直连 | TCP 源 IP | nftables/manual jail |
+| CMPP 17890 | 公网直连 | Gateway TCP 远端 IP | nftables/manual jail |
+
+只有当请求 TCP 来源属于定期同步的 Cloudflare 官方网段时，才信任 `CF-Connecting-IP`。客户端直连源站时提供的同名 Header 必须忽略。配置上线前必须用真实请求证明日志、事件和页面展示 IP 一致。
+
+## 5. 可配置规则
+
+### 5.1 可配置字段
+
+- 启用状态 `enabled`。
+- 统计窗口 `windowSeconds`。
+- 触发阈值 `threshold`。
+- 不同目标数量阈值 `distinctTargetThreshold`，仅恶意扫描等规则使用。
+- 告警冷却时间 `cooldownSeconds`。
+- 风险等级 `severity`。
+- 聚合维度，只能从规则预置集合选择，例如 `ip`、`ip+accountFingerprint`。
+- 默认封禁时长和允许的最大封禁时长。
+- 是否允许人工封禁；只读检测规则可以关闭封禁按钮。
+
+### 5.2 不可由页面配置的字段
+
+- filter 正则表达式。
+- 日志文件路径和 journal unit。
+- shell 命令、Fail2ban action、nftables 表/链。
+- Unix Socket 路径、systemd 服务名。
+- Cloudflare 可信网段来源。
+- 规则到执行器的映射。
+
+这些内容属于发布资产，必须通过代码评审、自动化测试和标准部署更新。
+
+### 5.3 配置保护
+
+- 每类规则设置服务端最小值、最大值和允许枚举；前端约束不能替代后端校验。
+- 阈值修改使用乐观锁版本号，防止多人覆盖。
+- 保存后生成新规则版本，安全代理先语法校验，再原子切换并 reload。
+- reload 失败时数据库状态标记 `apply_failed`，保留旧生效版本，页面明确展示“已保存但未生效”。
+- 每次变更保存操作人、原因、旧值、新值、生效版本、代理回执和时间。
+- 配置修改要求 `security.rule.manage` 权限和近期重新认证。
+
+## 6. 数据模型
+
+### 6.1 `SecurityDetectionRule`
+
+- `id`、`code`（唯一）、`name`、`category`、`description`。
+- `enabled`、`windowSeconds`、`threshold`、`distinctTargetThreshold`。
+- `cooldownSeconds`、`severity`、`groupingMode`。
+- `manualBlockAllowed`、`defaultBlockDurationSeconds`、`maxBlockDurationSeconds`。
+- `configVersion`、`effectiveVersion`、`applyStatus`、`lastApplyError`。
+- `updatedById`、`createdAt`、`updatedAt`。
+
+### 6.2 `SecurityDetectionEvent`
+
+- `id`、`eventKey`（唯一幂等键）、`ruleCode`、`sourceType`。
+- `sourceIp`、`accountFingerprint`、`targetFingerprint`、`requestPathNormalized`。
+- `occurredAt`、`receivedAt`、`evidenceSummary`、`metadata`。
+- `collectorInstanceId`、`ruleVersion`。
+
+`metadata` 使用后端安全 DTO，仅保存允许字段；禁止保存密钥和完整认证材料。
+
+### 6.3 `SecurityAlert`
+
+- `id`、`alertNo`、`fingerprint`、`ruleId`、`ruleSnapshot`。
+- `sourceIp`、`status`、`severity`。
+- `firstOccurredAt`、`lastOccurredAt`、`eventCount`、`distinctTargetCount`。
+- `cooldownUntil`、`assignedToId`、`handledById`、`handledAt`、`handleReason`。
+- `blockId`、`createdAt`、`updatedAt`。
+
+同一规则、IP、聚合维度和窗口桶使用唯一 fingerprint，重复采集只增加计数，不重复创建告警。
+
+### 6.4 `SecurityBlock`
+
+- `id`、`operationKey`（唯一）、`alertId`、`sourceIp`。
+- `executorType`、`executorTarget`、`durationSeconds`。
+- `status`：`requested/applying/blocked/unblock_requested/unblocked/expired/failed`。
+- `startedAt`、`expiresAt`、`verifiedAt`、`errorMessage`。
+- `requestedById`、`requestReason`、`unblockedById`、`unblockReason`。
+- `agentOperationId`、`createdAt`、`updatedAt`。
+
+### 6.5 `SecurityProtectedNetwork`
+
+- IP/CIDR、名称、类型、适用入口、启停状态、来源和备注。
+- 系统内置保护项不可从页面删除，只允许通过受控发布更新。
+- 人工保护项新增、修改和停用均要求重新认证和审计。
+
+## 7. 状态机与并发控制
+
+### 7.1 告警状态
+
+```text
+pending ──→ block_requested ──→ blocked ──→ unblocked
+   │               └──────────→ block_failed
+   ├──→ ignored
+   ├──→ whitelisted
+   └──→ expired
+```
+
+- `pending` 仅表示达到检测阈值，绝不代表已被防火墙封禁。
+- 封禁按钮通过数据库条件更新原子认领，只有一名操作人能进入 `block_requested`。
+- 代理执行成功后必须回读执行器状态，确认存在真实规则才写 `blocked`。
+- 网络超时导致结果不确定时先查询 `operationKey`，不得盲目重复封禁。
+- 忽略、保护名单和封禁互斥；状态变化后旧页面操作返回 409。
+
+### 7.2 封禁到期
+
+- 执行器负责真实到期解除；平台定时回读并同步 `expired`。
+- 平台任务只做状态对账，不能仅靠数据库时间把记录标记为已解封。
+- 对账发现执行器缺失、额外规则或到期未解除时生成系统告警。
+
+## 8. 后端接口
+
+```text
+GET  /api/admin/security-detection/overview
+GET  /api/admin/security-detection/trends
+GET  /api/admin/security-detection/alerts
+GET  /api/admin/security-detection/alerts/:id
+POST /api/admin/security-detection/alerts/:id/block
+POST /api/admin/security-detection/alerts/:id/ignore
+POST /api/admin/security-detection/alerts/:id/protect
+GET  /api/admin/security-detection/blocks
+POST /api/admin/security-detection/blocks/:id/unblock
+GET  /api/admin/security-detection/rules
+PUT  /api/admin/security-detection/rules/:id
+GET  /api/admin/security-detection/protected-networks
+GET  /api/admin/security-detection/health
+```
+
+封禁请求只接受固定时长枚举和原因。IP、规则、入口和执行器全部从告警及服务端映射读取，禁止前端重传或覆盖。
+
+## 9. 权限与审计
+
+| 权限 | 能力 |
+| --- | --- |
+| `security.alert.read` | 查看面板、告警和脱敏证据 |
+| `security.alert.handle` | 忽略告警、分派和填写处置说明 |
+| `security.block.manage` | 人工封禁与解封 |
+| `security.rule.manage` | 修改阈值、启停规则和保护名单 |
+
+封禁、解封、修改规则和保护名单必须要求近期重新认证；所有动作写入 `OperationLog`，记录资源、操作人、IP、原因、旧值、新值、代理回执和最终结果。读取完整证据也应记录访问审计。
+
+## 10. 自研 UI 信息架构
+
+菜单位置：`安全控制 / 安全检测`。
+
+### 10.1 总览
+
+- 待处置、高风险、当前真实封禁、24 小时攻击 IP、封禁失败五个指标。
+- 24 小时/7 天检测事件与告警趋势。
+- 按规则类型、入口和风险等级分布。
+- Top 攻击 IP、Top 扫描路径、Top 被尝试账号指纹。
+- Fail2ban、collector、agent、规则版本和执行器健康卡片。
+
+### 10.2 告警中心
+
+- 按关键词、IP、规则、风险、状态、入口和日期筛选，真实后端分页。
+- 列表展示风险、IP、类型、触发数、不同目标数、首次/最近时间、状态和操作。
+- 详情抽屉展示规则快照、聚合时间线、脱敏证据、关联告警和处置历史。
+- 封禁确认弹窗展示执行器、影响入口、时长、保护名单结果、近期合法访问提示和必填原因。
+
+### 10.3 规则配置
+
+- 使用平台现有自研 Card、Table、Tag、Modal、Form、Pagination 和图表体系，不嵌入 Fail2ban 第三方面板。
+- 每项配置展示当前生效值、待生效值、最后修改人和应用状态。
+- 数字输入同时展示单位、允许范围和默认建议值。
+- 保存前展示变更对比；应用失败不能显示成功 toast。
+
+### 10.4 封禁与保护名单
+
+- 独立展示真实封禁状态、执行器、到期时间、来源告警和操作人。
+- 保护名单命中时封禁按钮禁用并说明原因。
+- 不同执行器使用明确标签，避免把 Nginx deny 误称为防火墙封禁。
+
+## 11. 检测准确性要求
+
+### 11.1 HTTP API
+
+- 错误密钥：只记录不可逆密钥指纹，不记录完整 Header 或密钥。
+- 签名错误：区分缺失、格式错误、算法不支持、验签失败和时间偏差。
+- 重放：只有 nonce/幂等凭证已被真实使用或时间戳明显重复时计入；正常幂等重试按既有接口语义处理。
+- 恶意扫描：使用标准化路径，不保存 query 中的敏感值；规则需要“次数 + 不同路径数”双阈值，避免单个合法 404 被判攻击。
+- 反向代理真实 IP 必须经过可信代理链验证，禁止直接信任客户端 Header。
+
+### 11.2 CMPP
+
+- 未知账号、错误 AuthenticatorSource、不允许 IP、停用企业/应用和协议异常分别分类。
+- 不记录明文密码、完整 AuthenticatorSource 或平台配置密钥。
+- 正常断线、心跳超时、最大连接数限制和服务重启恢复不计为恶意认证。
+
+### 11.3 登录
+
+- 账号锁定仍由现有账户安全逻辑负责，安全检测面板不替代账号锁定。
+- 图形验证码错误、账号错误、密码错误和角色入口错误分别保存分类，但页面证据统一脱敏。
+- 一个入口的登录失败不得清理另一个入口的有效会话。
+
+## 12. 保留与隐私
+
+- 原始检测事件默认在线保留 30 天，聚合告警、封禁记录和操作审计默认保留 180 天；最终期限在上线前由安全和运营确认。
+- 清理使用小批量、可恢复任务；不得删除仍关联活动封禁、未完成处置或审计保留期内的数据。
+- 页面和导出默认脱敏账号、路径参数、User-Agent 中的可识别信息。
+- 第一版不提供原始日志全文导出。
+
+## 13. 可用性与降级
+
+- Fail2ban 不可用：页面显示检测源异常，已有告警仍可查看；相关来源不允许宣称“无攻击”。
+- Collector 不可用：健康状态告警并记录事件积压；恢复后按事件键幂等补录。
+- Security Agent 不可用：封禁按钮返回明确失败，不修改告警为已封禁。
+- PostgreSQL 不可用：不允许执行无法审计的封禁操作。
+- 规则应用失败：继续使用上一生效版本，页面显示失败版本与原因。
+- Nginx 或 nftables 回读不一致：封禁状态标记异常并产生系统告警。
+
+## 14. 部署前置条件
+
+1. 将 `cmpp-api.service` 改为专用非 root 用户并完成文件、日志、MinIO/local storage 权限回归。
+2. 安装 Fail2ban，固定版本并使用 nftables 兼容 action。
+3. 为 Nginx、sshd、Gateway 和 NestJS 建立结构化、脱敏且可测试的事件格式。
+4. 验证 Cloudflare 可信 IP 网段、`real_ip_header` 和源站绕过防护。
+5. 建立 root security agent、Unix Socket 权限、systemd 加固和固定协议。
+6. 发布前备份 PostgreSQL、运行源码、环境文件、Fail2ban/Nginx 平台生成配置和 nftables 当前规则。
+
+## 15. 分阶段实施建议
+
+### 阶段 A：检测与只读面板
+
+- 数据模型、默认规则、结构化事件、collector、Fail2ban alert-only jail。
+- 总览、告警列表、详情、规则只读展示和健康状态。
+- 使用真实日志、真实 PostgreSQL 和真实接口验收。
+
+### 阶段 B：阈值配置
+
+- 规则编辑、版本、后端边界、受控配置编译、校验、原子应用和回滚。
+- 配置变更对比、近期认证和审计。
+
+### 阶段 C：人工封禁
+
+- Security Agent、执行器、固定时长封禁、解封、保护名单、幂等和状态对账。
+- Cloudflare/Nginx 与直连/nftables 分入口验收。
+
+阶段 A、B、C 可以作为同一第一版需求连续交付，但验收必须逐阶段通过，不能为了展示按钮而跳过权限隔离和真实执行验证。
+
+## 16. 第一版完成标准
+
+- 九类检测全部有真实事件来源、默认规则、可配置阈值和原子测试。
+- 自研 UI 通过真实 API 展示面板、告警、规则、封禁和健康数据。
+- HTTP 错误密钥、签名错误、重放和恶意扫描均纳入第一版。
+- NestJS 非 root，无法执行任意系统命令或编辑 Fail2ban 配置。
+- 人工封禁按入口选择正确执行器，Cloudflare 场景不使用无效的访客 IP nftables 封禁。
+- 保护名单、重新认证、权限、幂等、并发和操作审计全部通过。
+- 只有回读执行器确认真实生效后，页面才显示“已封禁”。
+- 不发送短信、不修改通道账号/密码/启停状态、企业余额或客户连接。
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+# Fail2ban 安全检测与人工封禁第一版测试用例
+
+> 版本：V1.0（设计评审用例）<br>
+> 日期：2026-08-14<br>
+> 关联设计：`docs/fail2ban-assisted-blocking-design-20260814.md`<br>
+> 原则：真实后端、真实 PostgreSQL、真实日志与真实执行器；禁止 mock、静态数据和 localStorage 作为验收证据
+
+## 1. 测试边界
+
+- 自动化测试使用隔离的 Fail2ban/Nginx/nftables namespace 或测试节点，不得封禁测试执行机、预生产运维 IP、Cloudflare 节点或真实客户 IP。
+- 预生产验收优先使用文档保留测试 IP 和短时封禁；所有人工封禁必须先确认回滚路径。
+- 不发送、补发或重投短信，不修改通道账号、密码、启停状态、企业余额或客户连接。
+- HTTP 密钥、签名、CMPP AuthenticatorSource、账号和日志证据必须脱敏。
+
+## 2. 规则配置
+
+| 编号 | 优先级 | 测试步骤 | 预期结果 |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| TC-F2B-RULE-001 | P0 | 查询规则列表 | 返回九类第一版规则；数据来自 PostgreSQL；展示当前配置版本和生效版本 |
+| TC-F2B-RULE-002 | P0 | 修改规则阈值、窗口、冷却时间和风险等级并保存 | 写入真实数据库，生成新版本，代理校验并应用成功；回读值一致；写操作日志 |
+| TC-F2B-RULE-003 | P0 | 提交小于最小值、大于最大值、零、负数、小数、非数字或非法枚举 | 后端逐项拒绝，不生成规则版本，不依赖前端校验兜底 |
+| TC-F2B-RULE-004 | P0 | 两名管理员基于同一旧版本并发保存不同阈值 | 仅一方成功；另一方返回版本冲突，不覆盖新配置 |
+| TC-F2B-RULE-005 | P0 | 让新配置语法校验或 reload 失败 | 数据库标记 `apply_failed`；上一生效版本继续工作；页面不得提示已生效 |
+| TC-F2B-RULE-006 | P1 | 停用一条规则后持续产生匹配日志 | 停用后不创建新告警；已有告警和历史事件保留 |
+| TC-F2B-RULE-007 | P1 | 重新启用规则 | 新事件按当前版本统计，不错误合并停用期间日志 |
+| TC-F2B-RULE-008 | P0 | 尝试通过接口提交 regex、日志路径、shell、action、jail 名或执行器 | DTO 不接受或后端拒绝；配置文件和系统命令不受影响 |
+| TC-F2B-RULE-009 | P0 | 无 `security.rule.manage` 权限修改规则 | 返回 403，不写数据库、不调用安全代理 |
+| TC-F2B-RULE-010 | P0 | 超过近期认证时间后修改规则 | 要求重新认证；重新认证成功后才能保存 |
+
+## 3. 登录与 SSH 检测
+
+| 编号 | 优先级 | 测试步骤 | 预期结果 |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| TC-F2B-AUTH-001 | P0 | 同一测试 IP 在窗口内触发达到阈值的运营端密码错误 | 只生成一条聚合告警，计数准确，状态 `pending`，未自动封禁 |
+| TC-F2B-AUTH-002 | P0 | 同一测试 IP 在客户端登录达到阈值 | 产生客户端规则告警，不与运营端规则错误合并 |
+| TC-F2B-AUTH-003 | P1 | 失败次数低于阈值或分散在窗口外 | 保存检测事件但不产生达到阈值告警 |
+| TC-F2B-AUTH-004 | P0 | 同一浏览器已有有效运营会话时，在客户端提交错误登录 | 产生正确检测事件；运营会话不被清除、广播退出或跳转 |
+| TC-F2B-AUTH-005 | P0 | 检查事件、告警详情和日志 | 不含明文密码、密码散列、完整账号或验证码答案 |
+| TC-F2B-SSH-001 | P0 | 从保留测试 IP 对 12022 触发达到阈值的 SSH 失败 | Fail2ban 检测 jail 产生事件和告警，但 nftables 未自动加入封禁 |
+| TC-F2B-SSH-002 | P1 | SSH 登录成功、连接中断或握手超时 | 不错误计入认证失败规则 |
+| TC-F2B-SSH-003 | P0 | 重启 Fail2ban/collector 后重放同一事件 | `eventKey` 幂等，不重复增加计数或创建告警 |
+
+## 4. CMPP 检测
+
+| 编号 | 优先级 | 测试步骤 | 预期结果 |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| TC-F2B-CMPP-001 | P0 | 同一测试 IP 使用未知账号达到阈值 | 生成 `cmpp_auth_failure` 告警；保存脱敏账号指纹和真实 TCP IP |
+| TC-F2B-CMPP-002 | P0 | 使用错误 AuthenticatorSource 达到阈值 | 认证继续按原协议拒绝；告警分类准确；不保存完整 AuthenticatorSource |
+| TC-F2B-CMPP-003 | P0 | 从不允许 IP、停用企业或停用应用发起连接 | 原认证结果不变；事件分类可区分真实拒绝原因 |
+| TC-F2B-CMPP-004 | P0 | 高频发送非法包、异常版本或短连接扫描 | 达到协议滥用规则阈值后形成告警，不污染普通认证失败统计 |
+| TC-F2B-CMPP-005 | P1 | 正常断线、心跳超时、最大连接数限制或服务重启恢复 | 不作为恶意认证或协议滥用告警 |
+| TC-F2B-CMPP-006 | P0 | 检查事件和页面证据 | 不包含平台密码、完整认证材料、短信正文或通道凭据 |
+
+## 5. HTTP API 检测
+
+| 编号 | 优先级 | 测试步骤 | 预期结果 |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| TC-F2B-HTTP-001 | P0 | 同一 IP 使用不存在的 HTTP API 密钥达到阈值 | 生成 `http_invalid_api_key` 告警；仅保存不可逆密钥指纹 |
+| TC-F2B-HTTP-002 | P0 | 使用存在但错误的签名达到阈值 | 生成 `http_signature_failure`，不与错误密钥混淆，不保存签名密钥或完整签名 Header |
+| TC-F2B-HTTP-003 | P0 | 分别触发签名缺失、格式错误、算法不支持、验签失败和时间偏差 | 内部原因分类准确；页面使用安全文案；敏感细节不泄露给调用方 |
+| TC-F2B-HTTP-004 | P0 | 重复使用已消费 nonce/签名请求达到阈值 | 生成 `http_replay_attempt` 严重告警；原接口仍按既有幂等/重放规则拒绝 |
+| TC-F2B-HTTP-005 | P0 | 合法客户端按接口幂等协议重试同一业务请求 | 不误判为恶意重放；响应和业务幂等结果保持原语义 |
+| TC-F2B-HTTP-006 | P0 | 请求常见敏感路径和漏洞路径，达到次数及不同路径双阈值 | 生成 `http_malicious_scan`；路径已标准化且 query 敏感值不保存 |
+| TC-F2B-HTTP-007 | P0 | 对同一不存在业务路径重复请求，仅满足次数、不满足不同路径数 | 不触发恶意扫描告警 |
+| TC-F2B-HTTP-008 | P1 | 产生普通业务 400、字段校验失败、合法 401/403 和单次 404 | 不错误计入恶意扫描或错误密钥规则 |
+| TC-F2B-HTTP-009 | P0 | 从两个 IP 分别达到一半阈值 | 不跨 IP 错误聚合；每个 IP 独立计算 |
+| TC-F2B-HTTP-010 | P0 | 修改 HTTP 规则阈值后继续产生事件 | 新事件使用新生效版本，告警规则快照可追溯当时阈值 |
+
+## 6. Cloudflare 与真实 IP
+
+| 编号 | 优先级 | 测试步骤 | 预期结果 |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| TC-F2B-IP-001 | P0 | 经真实 Cloudflare 回源请求运营端和客户端 | 事件 IP 等于访客真实 IP，TCP 代理 IP 保留在安全元数据中但不作为攻击者 IP |
+| TC-F2B-IP-002 | P0 | 直连源站并伪造 `CF-Connecting-IP` | Header 被忽略，事件使用真实 TCP 来源 IP |
+| TC-F2B-IP-003 | P0 | 人工封禁 Cloudflare 入口告警 | 使用 Nginx real-IP deny，不调用访客 IP nftables action |
+| TC-F2B-IP-004 | P0 | 人工封禁灰云 API、SSH 或 CMPP 告警 | 使用 nftables/manual jail，不修改 Nginx Cloudflare deny 列表 |
+| TC-F2B-IP-005 | P0 | 尝试封禁 Cloudflare 官方节点、源站自身、回环、内网、运维和健康检查 IP | 后端和安全代理双重拒绝，记录保护名单命中，不产生真实封禁 |
+| TC-F2B-IP-006 | P1 | Cloudflare 官方网段更新 | 使用受控来源更新并审计；旧配置切换原子化；失败保留旧可信网段 |
+
+## 7. 告警聚合与状态机
+
+| 编号 | 优先级 | 测试步骤 | 预期结果 |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| TC-F2B-ALERT-001 | P0 | 同规则、IP、窗口内并发写入多条事件 | 唯一 fingerprint 生效，只创建一条告警，计数无丢失 |
+| TC-F2B-ALERT-002 | P0 | 冷却时间内再次达到阈值 | 更新原告警计数和最近时间，不产生告警风暴 |
+| TC-F2B-ALERT-003 | P1 | 冷却结束后再次达到阈值 | 按设计创建新告警或新周期，历史告警不覆盖 |
+| TC-F2B-ALERT-004 | P0 | 对 `pending` 告警执行忽略 | 状态原子变为 `ignored`，保留事件和原因，封禁按钮不可再执行 |
+| TC-F2B-ALERT-005 | P0 | 两名管理员同时对同一告警点击封禁和忽略 | 仅一个状态迁移成功，另一请求返回 409 |
+| TC-F2B-ALERT-006 | P1 | 告警超过可处置期限 | 状态变为 `expired`；历史仍可查询；不能用旧告警封禁 |
+
+## 8. 人工封禁与解封
+
+| 编号 | 优先级 | 测试步骤 | 预期结果 |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| TC-F2B-BLOCK-001 | P0 | 有权限管理员对待处理告警选择1小时、填写原因并确认 | 创建唯一操作记录，代理执行正确执行器，回读成功后状态才为 `blocked` |
+| TC-F2B-BLOCK-002 | P0 | 前端篡改 IP、jail、action、执行器或时长 | 后端忽略未定义字段或拒绝请求；实际值只来自告警和固定映射 |
+| TC-F2B-BLOCK-003 | P0 | 重复点击、网络超时重试或同一 `operationKey` 重放 | 代理和数据库幂等，仅存在一条真实封禁，不延长原期限 |
+| TC-F2B-BLOCK-004 | P0 | 代理返回成功但执行器回读不存在规则 | 不标记 `blocked`；状态为失败/异常并生成系统告警 |
+| TC-F2B-BLOCK-005 | P0 | Security Agent 停止或 Socket 不可用 | 明确返回封禁失败；告警不伪装已封禁；记录错误和审计 |
+| TC-F2B-BLOCK-006 | P0 | PostgreSQL 不可用时点击封禁 | 拒绝无法审计的操作，不调用代理 |
+| TC-F2B-BLOCK-007 | P0 | 无 `security.block.manage` 权限或近期认证过期 | 返回403或要求重新认证，不产生操作记录和系统封禁 |
+| TC-F2B-BLOCK-008 | P0 | 对已封禁 IP执行解封并填写原因 | 调用原执行器解除，回读确认后变为 `unblocked`，完整记录操作人和原因 |
+| TC-F2B-BLOCK-009 | P0 | 封禁自然到期 | 执行器真实解除；对账任务回读后更新 `expired`，不只依赖数据库时间 |
+| TC-F2B-BLOCK-010 | P0 | 到期后执行器仍存在规则或平台记录与执行器不一致 | 标记同步异常并告警，不静默显示已解封 |
+| TC-F2B-BLOCK-011 | P1 | 规则配置 `manualBlockAllowed=false` | 告警可查看，封禁按钮禁用，直接调用接口同样拒绝 |
+
+## 9. 保护名单
+
+| 编号 | 优先级 | 测试步骤 | 预期结果 |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| TC-F2B-PROTECT-001 | P0 | 查询保护名单 | 返回真实数据库和系统内置项，展示类型、范围和来源 |
+| TC-F2B-PROTECT-002 | P0 | 新增合法 IPv4、IPv6 或 CIDR 人工保护项 | 后端规范化、检查重叠并保存；要求权限、重新认证、原因和审计 |
+| TC-F2B-PROTECT-003 | P0 | 提交非法、过宽、重复或与系统项冲突的网段 | 后端拒绝，现有保护项不变化 |
+| TC-F2B-PROTECT-004 | P0 | 尝试删除系统内置保护项 | 拒绝；只能通过受控发布变更 |
+| TC-F2B-PROTECT-005 | P0 | 待处理告警 IP 后续加入保护名单 | 告警更新为 `whitelisted` 或明确标记保护命中，不允许封禁 |
+
+## 10. 自研 UI 与真实数据
+
+| 编号 | 优先级 | 测试步骤 | 预期结果 |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| TC-F2B-UI-001 | P0 | 进入“安全控制 / 安全检测” | 页面使用平台自研布局、组件和中文状态，不嵌入第三方 Fail2ban UI |
+| TC-F2B-UI-002 | P0 | 对照 SQL/API 检查总览五项指标、趋势、分布和 Top IP | 页面与真实后端结果一致，无 mock、静态或 localStorage 数据 |
+| TC-F2B-UI-003 | P0 | 使用 IP、规则、风险、状态、入口和日期组合筛选及分页 | 查询由后端完成；总数、页码、跨页结果准确 |
+| TC-F2B-UI-004 | P0 | 打开告警详情 | 显示规则快照、聚合时间线、脱敏证据和处置历史；无密钥或认证材料泄露 |
+| TC-F2B-UI-005 | P0 | 打开封禁确认弹窗 | 显示执行器、影响入口、固定时长、保护检查、风险提示和必填原因 |
+| TC-F2B-UI-006 | P0 | 规则保存成功、保存但应用失败、版本冲突 | 三种状态分别准确提示；失败不得显示成功 toast |
+| TC-F2B-UI-007 | P1 | 1440、1280、1024、768和375宽度验收 | 指标、图表、表格、筛选和弹窗无横向溢出；关键操作可见可用 |
+| TC-F2B-UI-008 | P1 | 仅键盘和读屏操作页面 | 表单有 label，错误有关联说明，状态不只依赖颜色，弹窗焦点和按钮名称准确 |
+| TC-F2B-UI-009 | P0 | 后端、collector 或 agent 不可用 | 页面显示明确降级和最后成功时间，不用空数据伪装“零攻击” |
+
+## 11. 权限、进程与系统加固
+
+| 编号 | 优先级 | 测试步骤 | 预期结果 |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| TC-F2B-SEC-001 | P0 | 检查 `cmpp-api.service` 和运行进程 | NestJS 使用专用非 root 用户；有效 UID/GID 非0 |
+| TC-F2B-SEC-002 | P0 | 检查 NestJS capabilities、sudoers、可写目录 | 无通用 sudo、无 `CAP_NET_ADMIN`/`CAP_SYS_ADMIN`；只能写明确业务和日志目录 |
+| TC-F2B-SEC-003 | P0 | 以 NestJS 用户尝试读取/写入 `/etc/fail2ban`、运行防火墙命令或访问代理管理文件 | 全部被操作系统权限拒绝 |
+| TC-F2B-SEC-004 | P0 | 检查 Security Agent Socket | 只在本机 Unix Socket，权限和用户组符合设计，无 TCP 监听 |
+| TC-F2B-SEC-005 | P0 | 向 Agent 提交未知动作、非法 JSON、超长字段、shell 字符和非白名单规则 | 全部拒绝且无命令执行；记录限量安全日志 |
+| TC-F2B-SEC-006 | P0 | 检查操作日志 | 规则变更、封禁、解封、忽略、保护名单、失败和回读异常均可追溯 |
+| TC-F2B-SEC-007 | P1 | 查看告警详情和完整证据 | 读取动作按设计写访问审计；低权限用户只能看到脱敏数据 |
+
+## 12. 可用性、恢复和数据保留
+
+| 编号 | 优先级 | 测试步骤 | 预期结果 |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| TC-F2B-OPS-001 | P0 | 停止 Fail2ban | 健康面板显示对应来源异常；已有告警可查；不得显示“当前无攻击” |
+| TC-F2B-OPS-002 | P0 | Collector 暂停后恢复并重放积压 | 事件按幂等键补录，计数准确，无重复告警 |
+| TC-F2B-OPS-003 | P0 | 重启 API、Gateway、Fail2ban、collector 和 agent | 已生效规则、活动封禁和告警状态恢复一致，不自动执行新封禁 |
+| TC-F2B-OPS-004 | P0 | 发布失败触发回滚 | PostgreSQL、代码、环境、Fail2ban/Nginx生成配置和防火墙规则均有可验证恢复路径 |
+| TC-F2B-OPS-005 | P1 | 执行30天事件、180天告警/审计保留任务 | 只删除到期且不受保护数据；活动封禁、未完成处置和审计期数据不删除 |
+| TC-F2B-OPS-006 | P1 | 大量扫描事件压测 | Collector 有界处理，API与Gateway业务不被阻塞；告警聚合避免写放大 |
+| TC-F2B-OPS-007 | P0 | 对比执行器、数据库和页面 | 当前封禁集合、到期时间和执行器类型一致；差异进入异常状态和告警 |
+
+## 13. 发布验收证据
+
+第一版发布前至少保留：
+
+1. Fail2ban filter 单元样例，包含命中与不命中日志。
+2. 九类规则的专项自动化结果。
+3. API 权限、参数边界、并发、幂等和审计测试。
+4. PostgreSQL migration 状态和表/索引/唯一约束核对。
+5. NestJS 非 root、capabilities、sudoers 和文件权限证据。
+6. Cloudflare 真实 IP、伪造 Header 和 Nginx 执行器真实验证。
+7. 直连 API/SSH/CMPP 的隔离测试 IP nftables 封禁与解封证据。
+8. Fail2ban、collector、agent、API、Gateway、Nginx、PostgreSQL 和 Redis 健康证据。
+9. 自研 UI 桌面端、平板端和移动端截图以及控制台日志。
+10. 发布前 PostgreSQL、运行源码、环境文件、生成配置和防火墙规则恢复资产校验。
+
+## 14. 判定规则
+
+- 任一 P0 失败：第一版不得发布。
+- 检测达到阈值但未生成告警、未达到阈值却告警、错误 IP 聚合、密钥泄露、保护地址可被封禁、页面显示封禁而执行器未生效、NestJS 仍为 root或可执行任意系统命令，均按 P0 处理。
+- 只验证 Fail2ban 命令输出、只验证前端样式或只写数据库不验证真实执行器，不能作为功能通过。
@@ -2070,3 +2070,11 @@
 2. 运营看板删除“今日签名发送统计”和“今日签名发送统计 - 含引流”两个明细模块；“今日活跃签名”指标仍使用当天真实发送聚合。今日消费金额的主数字必须与今日发送总量使用相同字号、字重和深色层级。
 3. 企业应用管理列表的状态、到达率、单价列在现有基础上缩窄约20%，提升大屏一次展示完整表格的概率；不得通过隐藏真实字段实现。
 4. 移动、联通、电信数据展示统一使用全局`CarrierTag`低饱和标签，包括通道与通道组、监控、报备、签名、短信审核、任务号码、发送记录及客户端发送详情等页面。筛选/表单控件的选项文案、图表图例、导出文本和业务说明仍使用纯文本，避免破坏交互、可访问性和机器可读输出；可取得运营商集合的三网通道按三个运营商标签展示，只有历史通道级字段时使用中性的“三网”标签。
+## Fail2ban 安全检测与人工封禁（2026-08-14）
+
+- 运营端“安全控制”新增“安全检测与封禁”自研页面，数据必须来自真实 NestJS API 与 PostgreSQL，包含总览、告警中心、九类规则配置、人工封禁记录和保护名单；不得嵌入第三方面板或使用 Mock、静态数据、localStorage 伪造检测状态。
+- 第一版检测运营端登录失败、客户端登录失败、SSH 认证失败、CMPP 认证失败、CMPP 协议滥用、HTTP 错误密钥、HTTP 签名错误、HTTP 重放及 HTTP 恶意扫描。规则阈值、窗口、冷却、风险级别、启停状态与封禁时长边界保存在数据库，并使用配置版本防止并发覆盖。
+- 检测只产生事件与人工告警，绝不自动封禁。人工封禁只允许 10 分钟、1 小时、24 小时或 7 天；操作要求近期重新认证、必填原因、保护名单校验、数据库原子认领和操作审计。执行器由服务端按可信入口固定映射，浏览器不得提交 jail、action、shell 参数或自选执行器。
+- NestJS 必须以专用非 root 用户运行，不得获得通用 sudo、任意 shell、直接编辑 `/etc/fail2ban/*` 或防火墙的能力。独立 root security agent 只监听本机 Unix Socket、接受固定 JSON 动作、使用参数数组执行固定操作，并在真实 nftables 或 Nginx deny 回读成功后才允许数据库标记 `blocked`。
+- 运营端/客户端的 Cloudflare 入口使用 Nginx real-IP deny；直连 HTTP API、SSH 与 CMPP 使用 nftables。只有可信代理 TCP 来源可以提供访客 IP；系统回环、私网、链路本地、组播和配置的运维/健康检查网段必须内置保护。
+- 规则更新先保存待应用版本，由安全代理生成固定 Fail2ban 配置、执行语法校验并 reload；失败保留上一生效值并展示失败原因，不得显示为已生效。完整架构、状态机、字段、接口和安全边界以 `docs/fail2ban-assisted-blocking-design-20260814.md` 为准。
@@ -93,6 +93,22 @@ git reset --hard origin/main
 bash tools/deploy/production-deploy.sh
 ```

+### Fail2ban 安全检测发布前置条件
+
+本功能包含新增 PostgreSQL migration、非 root API 身份、安全代理、Fail2ban、Nginx include 和 nftables 表，不能按普通前端热发布处理。发布前除平台标准 PostgreSQL、运行源码和环境文件恢复资产外，必须额外备份 `/etc/systemd/system/cmpp-api.service*`、`/etc/systemd/system/cmpp-security-agent.service`、`/etc/fail2ban`、`/etc/nginx`、`/etc/nftables.conf`、`/etc/nftables.d` 和 `/var/lib/cmpp-security-agent`，并逐项生成、复核 SHA-256。
+
+发布脚本会构建 `cmpp-security-agent` 并运行 `tools/security/install-security-agent.sh`。安装器创建专用 `cmpp-api` 用户和 `cmpp-security` 组、写入 systemd 加固 drop-in、安装固定 Fail2ban filter/action、校验 Nginx/Fail2ban/nftables，但不会执行任何人工封禁。环境文件至少明确：
+
+```bash
+SECURITY_AGENT_SOCKET=/run/cmpp-security-agent/agent.sock
+SECURITY_AGENT_TIMEOUT_MS=3000
+SECURITY_EVENT_TOKEN=<至少32字节随机值，仅供Gateway和安全代理上报固定事件>
+TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS=127.0.0.1,::1
+SECURITY_BUILTIN_PROTECTED_NETWORKS=<运维出口CIDR,健康检查CIDR,源站公网IP>
+```
+
+正式 Nginx 的 `sms.lisglo.com` 运营端/客户端 server 块必须 `include /etc/nginx/snippets/cmpp-security-deny.conf;`；API 专用域名继续只开放客户接口。Cloudflare `real_ip_header` 及可信网段必须按官方来源单独维护和验证，禁止信任任意客户端 `CF-Connecting-IP` 或 `X-Forwarded-For`。发布后需证明 `cmpp-api` 进程用户不是 root、无 sudo 权限且无法写 `/etc/fail2ban`，安全代理 Socket 不监听 TCP，九类规则版本一致，Fail2ban 为 report-only，nftables/Nginx 回读与数据库状态一致。任何一项失败均不得开放人工封禁按钮。
+
 部署脚本重启 Gateway、API 和 Nginx 后，会分别对 Gateway、API 健康接口执行最多 60 秒的逐秒就绪检查。Nest 初始化、活动通道恢复或生产数据量增加可能使 API 启动超过固定数秒；发布流程不得用单次固定延时把正常慢启动误判为失败。超过 60 秒仍不健康时才终止发布，并结合 systemd journal 和发布前数据库、源码、环境备份判断回滚方式。

 ## 账号和密钥
@@ -4650,3 +4650,9 @@ npm run verify:phase8
 | TC-INFRA-MON-015 | 响应式与无障碍 | 在1536×1024、1280×800和390×844打开页面，操作范围和刷新按钮 | 桌面信息层级符合设计稿；窄屏无内容重叠和页面横向溢出；按钮有可读名称，活动范围和告警严重性不只依赖颜色表达 |
 | TC-INFRA-MON-016 | 配置和部署幂等 | 在测试服务器重复执行监控安装脚本和配置校验 | 不重复创建系统用户，不开放公网端口；配置通过`promtool check config/rules`，服务保持active，CMPP API/Gateway不因安装被重启 |
 | TC-INFRA-MON-017 | 业务数据隔离 | 运行监控24小时并检查PostgreSQL业务库和指标标签 | 监控时序只保存在Prometheus TSDB，业务PostgreSQL无高频指标写入；标签、日志和API响应不含手机号、短信正文、账号或密钥 |
+## Fail2ban 安全检测与人工封禁测试矩阵（2026-08-14）
+
+- 本模块必须执行 `docs/fail2ban-assisted-blocking-test-cases-20260814.md` 中 TC-F2B 全量用例，专项用例是本平台功能测试的组成部分，不是可选附录。
+- P0 门禁至少覆盖：九类规则真实 PostgreSQL 默认值与版本冲突、阈值边界、规则应用失败保留旧生效值、登录/HTTP/CMPP/SSH/Nginx 真实事件脱敏、事件键幂等、窗口聚合并发、可信代理 IP、Cloudflare 与直连入口执行器映射、系统和人工保护网段、近期重新认证、重复封禁原子认领、代理超时/失败、真实执行器回读、非 root NestJS 及任意命令/参数注入拒绝。
+- 集成验收必须在隔离测试节点或网络 namespace 使用文档保留 IP；不得封禁预生产运维出口、Cloudflare 节点或真实客户 IP。未安装真实 Fail2ban/nftables/Nginx 资产时，只能把相关用例标记阻塞，不得用 Mock 通过代替。
+- UI 验收覆盖桌面与窄屏的总览、告警、规则、封禁记录、保护名单、加载、空数据、失败和规则未生效状态；所有数字与操作结果必须能从 API、数据库、agent 与执行器证据交叉验证。
@@ -3582,3 +3582,12 @@ git diff --check
 - 专项Jest 1套/4项、API全量38套/467项通过，覆盖范围白名单、Prometheus HTTP响应契约解析、固定60秒step、服务别名、活动告警、不可用无陈旧数据及监控地址安全约束；全量Jest仍因仓库既有异步句柄使用`--forceExit`收尾。API正式TypeScript、前端TypeScript、Vite 8.1.5生产构建、两个Shell脚本语法及`git diff --check`通过；Vite仅保留既有约2.10MB单chunk提示。
 - 浏览器优先检查现有页面：本地运营端无有效登录Session，被正常引导到带算术验证码的登录页；未绕过登录、未读取或填写验证码，因此登录后桌面与窄屏视觉验收尚未完成。真实Prometheus/Node Exporter集成和告警触发验收必须在明确授权安装的测试或预生产窗口执行，当前不以单测替代真实基础设施验收。
 - 本轮代码、配置和文档保持未提交、未推送、未部署，没有发送、补发或重投短信，没有修改通道账号、密码、启停状态、企业余额、客户连接或预生产数据。既有构建缓存、`outputs/`和空文件`=`继续保护；并行会话新增的Fail2ban设计与测试文档不属于本需求，不修改、不归因。
+# 2026-08-14 Fail2ban 安全检测与人工封禁第一版（本地实现完成、未发布）
+
+- 新增真实 PostgreSQL 安全规则、事件、告警、封禁和保护网段模型及第88条 migration `20260814150000_add_security_detection`；九类默认规则覆盖运营端/客户端登录、SSH、CMPP认证与协议滥用、HTTP错误密钥/签名/重放和Nginx恶意扫描。应用事件按事件键幂等并使用PostgreSQL advisory transaction lock串行聚合；Fail2ban命中作为其自身窗口已达到阈值的聚合事件处理，不会再要求重复达到第二层阈值。
+- 运营端新增“安全控制 / 安全检测与封禁”自研页面，使用真实API展示总览、告警、规则、封禁记录和保护名单；规则修改、封禁、解封、忽略和保护名单写操作要求近期重新认证。封禁时长为固定枚举，执行器由服务端按入口映射，浏览器不能传jail、action、shell或执行器参数；系统私网/回环等内置保护和人工CIDR保护在调用代理前拦截。
+- 新增独立Go `cmpp-security-agent`、Unix Socket固定协议、report-only Fail2ban action/filter、Nginx real-IP deny、nftables timeout set和systemd加固。NestJS部署身份改为专用非root `cmpp-api`，安全事件入口新增独立内部令牌；agent不使用shell拼接，规则/Nginx配置校验或reload失败会恢复旧文件，只有真实执行器回读命中后数据库才标记`blocked`。
+- 登录、OpenAPI鉴权和Gateway已接入结构化安全事件；错误HTTP密钥只保存不可逆账号指纹，证据字段统一过滤password/secret/token/signature/access-key。反向代理地址只在TCP来源属于`TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS`时信任`X-Forwarded-For`，避免客户端伪造来源IP。
+- Prisma schema validate、API与前端TypeScript、API全量40套/472项、Fail2ban专项和Gateway控制器3套/11项、Gateway全量`go test ./...`、Vite 8.1.5生产构建、3个Shell脚本语法和`git diff --check`通过；Vite仅有既有约2.11MiB单chunk提示，全量Jest仍使用`--forceExit`收尾既有异步句柄。
+- 浏览器优先接管本地路由，`/admin/security-detection`在无有效Session时正确跳转运营端登录并保留返回地址，控制台error/warn为0；未读取、重置或猜测账号，登录后页面视觉与交互验收尚未完成。真实Fail2ban、Nginx、nftables、Unix Socket和第88条migration未在本机数据库或预生产安装/执行，必须在具备恢复资产和文档保留测试IP的授权发布窗口完成，当前不以Mock替代集成验收。
+- 本轮未发送、补发或重投短信，未修改通道账号、密码、启停状态、企业余额、客户连接或预生产数据；`api/tsconfig.build.tsbuildinfo`、`tsconfig.tsbuildinfo`、`outputs/`和空文件`=`继续作为受保护项排除提交。
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ func main() {
 			PresenceStore:      presenceStore,
 			RecoveryStore:      recoveryStore,
 			GatewayInstanceID:  getenv("GATEWAY_INSTANCE_ID", hostname()),
+			SecurityEventToken: os.Getenv("SECURITY_EVENT_TOKEN"),
 		}).ListenAndServe(); err != nil {
 			log.Fatalf("gateway inbound server stopped: %v", err)
 		}
@@ -0,0 +1,395 @@
+// security-agent is the deliberately tiny privileged boundary for manual blocking.
+// It accepts only a fixed JSON protocol over a Unix socket; it never invokes a shell
+// and never accepts command, jail, action, path, or argument strings from NestJS.
+package main
+
+import (
+	"bufio"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"log"
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"sort"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+)
+
+type request struct {
+	Action          string `json:"action"`
+	OperationKey    string `json:"operationKey"`
+	SourceIP        string `json:"sourceIp"`
+	Executor        string `json:"executor"`
+	DurationSeconds int    `json:"durationSeconds"`
+	Version         int    `json:"version"`
+	Rules           []rule `json:"rules"`
+}
+type rule struct {
+	Code            string `json:"code"`
+	Enabled         bool   `json:"enabled"`
+	Threshold       int    `json:"threshold"`
+	WindowSeconds   int    `json:"windowSeconds"`
+	CooldownSeconds int    `json:"cooldownSeconds"`
+}
+type response struct {
+	OK        bool   `json:"ok"`
+	Reference string `json:"reference,omitempty"`
+	Blocked   bool   `json:"blocked,omitempty"`
+	Active    bool   `json:"active,omitempty"`
+	Error     string `json:"error,omitempty"`
+}
+type block struct {
+	OperationKey string    `json:"operationKey"`
+	SourceIP     string    `json:"sourceIp"`
+	Executor     string    `json:"executor"`
+	ExpiresAt    time.Time `json:"expiresAt"`
+}
+type state struct {
+	Blocks      map[string]block `json:"blocks"`
+	RuleVersion int              `json:"ruleVersion"`
+}
+
+var allowedDurations = map[int]bool{600: true, 3600: true, 86400: true, 604800: true}
+var allowedRules = map[string]bool{"admin_login_failure": true, "client_login_failure": true, "ssh_auth_failure": true, "cmpp_auth_failure": true, "cmpp_protocol_abuse": true, "http_invalid_api_key": true, "http_signature_failure": true, "http_replay_attempt": true, "http_malicious_scan": true}
+
+type agent struct {
+	mu                                      sync.Mutex
+	statePath, nginxInclude, fail2banConfig string
+	data                                    state
+}
+
+func main() {
+	if len(os.Args) == 4 && os.Args[1] == "report" {
+		if err := reportEvent(os.Args[2], os.Args[3]); err != nil {
+			log.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		return
+	}
+	socketPath := env("SECURITY_AGENT_SOCKET", "/run/cmpp-security-agent/agent.sock")
+	a := &agent{statePath: env("SECURITY_AGENT_STATE", "/var/lib/cmpp-security-agent/state.json"), nginxInclude: env("SECURITY_NGINX_DENY_INCLUDE", "/etc/nginx/snippets/cmpp-security-deny.conf"), fail2banConfig: env("SECURITY_FAIL2BAN_CONFIG", "/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/cmpp-platform-generated.local"), data: state{Blocks: map[string]block{}}}
+	if err := a.load(); err != nil {
+		log.Fatalf("load state: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(socketPath), 0750); err != nil {
+		log.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	_ = os.Remove(socketPath)
+	listener, err := net.Listen("unix", socketPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := os.Chmod(socketPath, 0660); err != nil {
+		log.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer listener.Close()
+	log.Printf("security agent listening on %s", socketPath)
+	for {
+		connection, err := listener.Accept()
+		if err != nil {
+			log.Printf("accept: %v", err)
+			continue
+		}
+		go a.serve(connection)
+	}
+}
+
+func (a *agent) serve(connection net.Conn) {
+	defer connection.Close()
+	_ = connection.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second))
+	var req request
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(bufio.NewReader(connection)).Decode(&req); err != nil {
+		write(connection, response{Error: "invalid request"})
+		return
+	}
+	a.mu.Lock()
+	defer a.mu.Unlock()
+	a.prune()
+	var result response
+	switch req.Action {
+	case "block":
+		result = a.block(req)
+	case "unblock":
+		result = a.unblock(req)
+	case "status":
+		result = a.status(req)
+	case "apply_rules":
+		result = a.applyRules(req)
+	default:
+		result = response{Error: "unsupported action"}
+	}
+	write(connection, result)
+}
+
+func (a *agent) block(req request) response {
+	if net.ParseIP(req.SourceIP) == nil || !allowedDurations[req.DurationSeconds] || (req.Executor != "nftables" && req.Executor != "nginx_real_ip") || len(req.OperationKey) < 16 {
+		return response{Error: "invalid fixed block parameters"}
+	}
+	if existing, ok := a.data.Blocks[req.OperationKey]; ok {
+		return response{OK: true, Reference: req.OperationKey, Blocked: existing.ExpiresAt.After(time.Now())}
+	}
+	if req.Executor == "nftables" {
+		if err := nftBlock(req.SourceIP, req.DurationSeconds); err != nil {
+			return response{Error: err.Error()}
+		}
+	}
+	a.data.Blocks[req.OperationKey] = block{OperationKey: req.OperationKey, SourceIP: req.SourceIP, Executor: req.Executor, ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Duration(req.DurationSeconds) * time.Second)}
+	if req.Executor == "nginx_real_ip" {
+		if err := a.writeNginx(); err != nil {
+			delete(a.data.Blocks, req.OperationKey)
+			return response{Error: err.Error()}
+		}
+	}
+	if err := a.save(); err != nil {
+		return response{Error: err.Error()}
+	}
+	return a.status(req)
+}
+
+func (a *agent) unblock(req request) response {
+	if net.ParseIP(req.SourceIP) == nil || (req.Executor != "nftables" && req.Executor != "nginx_real_ip") {
+		return response{Error: "invalid fixed unblock parameters"}
+	}
+	if req.Executor == "nftables" {
+		if err := nftUnblock(req.SourceIP); err != nil {
+			return response{Error: err.Error()}
+		}
+	}
+	for key, item := range a.data.Blocks {
+		if item.SourceIP == req.SourceIP && item.Executor == req.Executor {
+			delete(a.data.Blocks, key)
+		}
+	}
+	if req.Executor == "nginx_real_ip" {
+		if err := a.writeNginx(); err != nil {
+			return response{Error: err.Error()}
+		}
+	}
+	if err := a.save(); err != nil {
+		return response{Error: err.Error()}
+	}
+	return response{OK: true, Reference: req.OperationKey}
+}
+
+func (a *agent) status(req request) response {
+	active := command("systemctl", "is-active", "--quiet", "fail2ban") == nil
+	if req.SourceIP == "" {
+		return response{OK: true, Active: active}
+	}
+	blocked := false
+	if req.Executor == "nftables" {
+		family := "blocked_ipv6"
+		if net.ParseIP(req.SourceIP).To4() != nil {
+			family = "blocked_ipv4"
+		}
+		output, err := exec.Command("nft", "list", "set", "inet", "cmpp_security", family).CombinedOutput()
+		if err != nil {
+			return response{Error: "nftables readback failed: " + strings.TrimSpace(string(output))}
+		}
+		blocked = strings.Contains(string(output), req.SourceIP+" timeout") || strings.Contains(string(output), req.SourceIP+" expires")
+	} else if req.Executor == "nginx_real_ip" {
+		content, err := os.ReadFile(a.nginxInclude)
+		if err != nil {
+			return response{Error: "nginx deny readback failed: " + err.Error()}
+		}
+		blocked = strings.Contains(string(content), "deny "+req.SourceIP+";")
+	} else {
+		return response{Error: "invalid executor"}
+	}
+	for _, item := range a.data.Blocks {
+		if blocked && item.SourceIP == req.SourceIP && item.Executor == req.Executor && item.ExpiresAt.After(time.Now()) {
+			return response{OK: true, Active: active, Blocked: true, Reference: item.OperationKey}
+		}
+	}
+	return response{OK: true, Active: active, Blocked: false}
+}
+
+func (a *agent) applyRules(req request) response {
+	if req.Version <= a.data.RuleVersion {
+		return response{OK: true, Reference: strconv.Itoa(a.data.RuleVersion)}
+	}
+	for _, item := range req.Rules {
+		if !allowedRules[item.Code] || item.Threshold < 1 || item.Threshold > 100000 || item.WindowSeconds < 10 || item.WindowSeconds > 86400 || item.CooldownSeconds < 0 || item.CooldownSeconds > 604800 {
+			return response{Error: "invalid fixed rule configuration"}
+		}
+	}
+	var ssh, scan *rule
+	for index := range req.Rules {
+		if req.Rules[index].Code == "ssh_auth_failure" {
+			ssh = &req.Rules[index]
+		}
+		if req.Rules[index].Code == "http_malicious_scan" {
+			scan = &req.Rules[index]
+		}
+	}
+	content := "# Generated by cmpp-security-agent. Manual changes will be overwritten.\n"
+	if ssh != nil {
+		content += jail("sshd", *ssh)
+	}
+	if scan != nil {
+		content += jail("cmpp-http-scan", *scan)
+	}
+	previous, previousErr := os.ReadFile(a.fail2banConfig)
+	if err := atomicWrite(a.fail2banConfig, []byte(content), 0640); err != nil {
+		return response{Error: err.Error()}
+	}
+	if err := command("fail2ban-client", "-t"); err != nil {
+		restore(a.fail2banConfig, previous, previousErr, 0640)
+		return response{Error: "fail2ban validation failed: " + err.Error()}
+	}
+	if err := command("fail2ban-client", "reload"); err != nil {
+		restore(a.fail2banConfig, previous, previousErr, 0640)
+		return response{Error: "fail2ban reload failed: " + err.Error()}
+	}
+	a.data.RuleVersion = req.Version
+	if err := a.save(); err != nil {
+		return response{Error: err.Error()}
+	}
+	return response{OK: true, Reference: strconv.Itoa(req.Version), Active: true}
+}
+
+func jail(name string, item rule) string {
+	enabled := "false"
+	if item.Enabled {
+		enabled = "true"
+	}
+	bantime := item.CooldownSeconds
+	if bantime < item.WindowSeconds {
+		bantime = item.WindowSeconds
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf("\n[%s]\nenabled = %s\nfindtime = %d\nmaxretry = %d\nbantime = %d\naction = cmpp-report-only\n", name, enabled, item.WindowSeconds, item.Threshold, bantime)
+}
+func nftBlock(ip string, seconds int) error {
+	family := "blocked_ipv6"
+	if net.ParseIP(ip).To4() != nil {
+		family = "blocked_ipv4"
+	}
+	return command("nft", "add", "element", "inet", "cmpp_security", family, fmt.Sprintf("{ %s timeout %ds }", ip, seconds))
+}
+func nftUnblock(ip string) error {
+	family := "blocked_ipv6"
+	if net.ParseIP(ip).To4() != nil {
+		family = "blocked_ipv4"
+	}
+	err := command("nft", "delete", "element", "inet", "cmpp_security", family, fmt.Sprintf("{ %s }", ip))
+	if err != nil && strings.Contains(err.Error(), "No such file") {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return err
+}
+func (a *agent) writeNginx() error {
+	ips := []string{}
+	for _, item := range a.data.Blocks {
+		if item.Executor == "nginx_real_ip" && item.ExpiresAt.After(time.Now()) {
+			ips = append(ips, item.SourceIP)
+		}
+	}
+	sort.Strings(ips)
+	lines := []string{"# Generated by cmpp-security-agent."}
+	for _, ip := range ips {
+		lines = append(lines, "deny "+ip+";")
+	}
+	previous, previousErr := os.ReadFile(a.nginxInclude)
+	if err := atomicWrite(a.nginxInclude, []byte(strings.Join(lines, "\n")+"\n"), 0640); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := command("nginx", "-t"); err != nil {
+		restore(a.nginxInclude, previous, previousErr, 0640)
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := command("systemctl", "reload", "nginx"); err != nil {
+		restore(a.nginxInclude, previous, previousErr, 0640)
+		_ = command("systemctl", "reload", "nginx")
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+func (a *agent) prune() {
+	changed := false
+	for key, item := range a.data.Blocks {
+		if !item.ExpiresAt.After(time.Now()) {
+			delete(a.data.Blocks, key)
+			changed = true
+		}
+	}
+	if changed {
+		_ = a.writeNginx()
+		_ = a.save()
+	}
+}
+func (a *agent) load() error {
+	bytes, err := os.ReadFile(a.statePath)
+	if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return json.Unmarshal(bytes, &a.data)
+}
+func (a *agent) save() error {
+	bytes, err := json.MarshalIndent(a.data, "", "  ")
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return atomicWrite(a.statePath, bytes, 0600)
+}
+func atomicWrite(path string, bytes []byte, mode os.FileMode) error {
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0750); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	temporary := path + ".tmp"
+	if err := os.WriteFile(temporary, bytes, mode); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return os.Rename(temporary, path)
+}
+func restore(path string, previous []byte, previousErr error, mode os.FileMode) {
+	if previousErr == nil {
+		_ = atomicWrite(path, previous, mode)
+	} else if errors.Is(previousErr, os.ErrNotExist) {
+		_ = os.Remove(path)
+	}
+}
+func command(name string, args ...string) error {
+	output, err := exec.Command(name, args...).CombinedOutput()
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s: %s", err, strings.TrimSpace(string(output)))
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+func write(connection net.Conn, value response) { _ = json.NewEncoder(connection).Encode(value) }
+func env(name, fallback string) string {
+	if value := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(name)); value != "" {
+		return value
+	}
+	return fallback
+}
+func reportEvent(jail, ip string) error {
+	ruleCode := map[string]string{"sshd": "ssh_auth_failure", "cmpp-http-scan": "http_malicious_scan"}[jail]
+	if ruleCode == "" || net.ParseIP(ip) == nil {
+		return errors.New("unsupported report event")
+	}
+	body := fmt.Sprintf(`{"ruleCode":%q,"sourceIp":%q,"protocol":%q,"resultCode":%q}`, ruleCode, ip, "fail2ban", jail)
+	client := &http.Client{Timeout: 3 * time.Second}
+	request, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, env("SECURITY_EVENT_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/gateway/events/security-detection"), strings.NewReader(body))
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	request.Header.Set("X-Security-Event-Token", os.Getenv("SECURITY_EVENT_TOKEN"))
+	response, err := client.Do(request)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	defer response.Body.Close()
+	if response.StatusCode < 200 || response.StatusCode >= 300 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("event collector returned %s", response.Status)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
@@ -37,10 +37,12 @@ func (s Server) handleLogin(response *cmpp.Response, packet *cmpp.Packet, logger
 	}
 	account := strings.TrimRight(req.SrcAddr, "\x00")
 	if account == "" {
+		go s.reportSecurityEvent("cmpp_protocol_abuse", remoteIP(packet.Conn.Conn.RemoteAddr()), "EMPTY_SOURCE_ADDRESS", cmppVersionName(req.Version))
 		setInboundConnectResponse(response.Packer, cmpp.ErrnoConnInvalidSrcAddr, req.AuthSrc, "", req.Version)
 		return false, cmpp.ConnRspStatusErrMap[cmpp.ErrnoConnInvalidSrcAddr]
 	}
 	if req.Version != cmpp.V20 && req.Version != cmpp.V21 && req.Version != cmpp.V30 {
+		go s.reportSecurityEvent("cmpp_protocol_abuse", remoteIP(packet.Conn.Conn.RemoteAddr()), "UNSUPPORTED_VERSION", cmppVersionName(req.Version))
 		setInboundConnectResponse(response.Packer, cmpp.ErrnoConnVerTooHigh, req.AuthSrc, "", cmpp.V30)
 		return false, cmpp.ConnRspStatusErrMap[cmpp.ErrnoConnVerTooHigh]
 	}
@@ -129,3 +131,18 @@ func (s Server) authenticate(remote net.Addr, account string, authSource string,
 	err := s.post(context.Background(), "/gateway/events/inbound/authenticate", payload, &result)
 	return result, err
 }
+
+func (s Server) reportSecurityEvent(ruleCode, sourceIP, resultCode, protocol string) {
+	if net.ParseIP(sourceIP) == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	payload := map[string]any{
+		"ruleCode": ruleCode, "sourceIp": sourceIP, "resultCode": resultCode, "protocol": protocol,
+	}
+	var result struct {
+		Accepted bool `json:"accepted"`
+	}
+	if err := s.post(context.Background(), "/gateway/events/security-detection", payload, &result); err != nil {
+		log.Printf("security event report failed rule=%s remote=%s err=%v", ruleCode, sourceIP, err)
+	}
+}
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ const defaultHTTPTimeout = 10 * time.Second
 type Server struct {
 	Addr                 string
 	APIBaseURL           string
+	SecurityEventToken   string
 	HTTPClient           *http.Client
 	LogWriter            io.Writer
 	PendingFlushInterval time.Duration
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ func (s Server) post(ctx context.Context, path string, payload any, result any)
 		return err
 	}
 	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	if strings.HasSuffix(path, "/security-detection") && s.SecurityEventToken != "" {
+		req.Header.Set("X-Security-Event-Token", s.SecurityEventToken)
+	}
 	resp, err := client.Do(req)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+import { request, withQuery } from '../core/httpClient';
+import type { SecurityAlert, SecurityBlock, SecurityOverview, SecurityProtectedNetwork, SecurityRule } from '../types';
+
+export const adminSecurityDetectionApi = {
+  getSecurityOverview: (range = '24h') => request<SecurityOverview>(withQuery('/admin/security-detection/overview', { range })),
+  listSecurityAlerts: (query: Record<string, string | number | undefined> = {}) => request<{ items: SecurityAlert[]; total: number }> (withQuery('/admin/security-detection/alerts', query)),
+  listSecurityRules: () => request<SecurityRule[]>('/admin/security-detection/rules'),
+  updateSecurityRule: (id: string, body: Partial<SecurityRule>) => request<SecurityRule>(`/admin/security-detection/rules/${id}`, { method: 'PUT', body: JSON.stringify(body) }),
+  blockSecurityAlert: (id: string, body: { durationSeconds: number; reason: string }) => request<SecurityBlock>(`/admin/security-detection/alerts/${id}/block`, { method: 'POST', body: JSON.stringify(body) }),
+  ignoreSecurityAlert: (id: string, reason: string) => request<{ success: boolean }>(`/admin/security-detection/alerts/${id}/ignore`, { method: 'POST', body: JSON.stringify({ reason }) }),
+  listSecurityBlocks: () => request<SecurityBlock[]>('/admin/security-detection/blocks'),
+  unblockSecurityBlock: (id: string, reason: string) => request<SecurityBlock>(`/admin/security-detection/blocks/${id}/unblock`, { method: 'POST', body: JSON.stringify({ reason }) }),
+  listProtectedNetworks: () => request<SecurityProtectedNetwork[]>('/admin/security-detection/protected-networks'),
+  addProtectedNetwork: (body: { network: string; name: string; reason: string }) => request<SecurityProtectedNetwork>('/admin/security-detection/protected-networks', { method: 'POST', body: JSON.stringify(body) }),
+};
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import { adminGovernanceApi } from './admin/governance.api';
 import { adminFilesApi } from './admin/files.api';
 import { adminSignatureRetirementApi } from './admin/signature-retirement.api';
 import { adminInfrastructureMonitoringApi } from './admin/infrastructure-monitoring.api';
+import { adminSecurityDetectionApi } from './admin/security-detection.api';

 export const adminApi = {
  ...adminIdentityApi,
@@ -20,4 +21,5 @@ export const adminApi = {
  ...adminFilesApi,
  ...adminSignatureRetirementApi,
  ...adminInfrastructureMonitoringApi,
+  ...adminSecurityDetectionApi,
 };
@@ -5,3 +5,4 @@ export * from './operations';
 export * from './governance';
 export * from './signature-retirement';
 export * from './infrastructure-monitoring';
+export * from './security-detection';
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+export type SecurityRule = {
+  id: string; code: string; name: string; sourceType: string; enabled: boolean;
+  threshold: number; windowSeconds: number; cooldownSeconds: number; severity: string;
+  defaultBlockSeconds: number; maximumBlockSeconds: number; configVersion: number;
+  effectiveVersion: number; applyStatus: string; lastApplyError?: string | null;
+};
+export type SecurityAlert = {
+  id: string; fingerprint: string; sourceIp: string; severity: string; status: string;
+  eventCount: number; firstOccurredAt: string; lastOccurredAt: string; rule: SecurityRule;
+};
+export type SecurityBlock = { id: string; sourceIp: string; executor: string; status: string; durationSeconds: number; reason: string; requestedAt: string; expiresAt?: string | null; lastError?: string | null };
+export type SecurityProtectedNetwork = { id: string; network: string; name: string; reason: string; enabled: boolean; createdAt: string };
+export type SecurityOverview = {
+  range: string; collectedAt: string; totalEvents: number; activeAlerts: number; criticalAlerts: number; activeBlocks: number;
+  health: { agent: string; agentError?: string; rulesEffective: number; rulesTotal: number };
+  sourceDistribution: Array<{ name: string; value: number }>;
+  alerts: SecurityAlert[];
+};
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+.admin-security-page{gap:20px}.security-heading{align-items:flex-end}.security-heading h1{margin:10px 0 4px;font-size:26px}.security-heading p{margin:0;color:#64748b}.security-kpis{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(4,minmax(0,1fr));gap:14px}.security-kpi{display:grid;grid-template-columns:42px 1fr;grid-template-rows:auto auto;gap:3px 12px;padding:18px}.security-kpi>div{grid-row:1/3;width:42px;height:42px;border-radius:12px;display:grid;place-items:center;background:#e8f0ff;color:#2563eb}.security-kpi>div svg{width:20px}.security-kpi span{font-size:13px;color:#64748b}.security-kpi strong{font-size:24px;line-height:1.1}.security-kpi.is-danger>div{background:#fef2f2;color:#dc2626}.security-overview-grid{display:grid;grid-template-columns:minmax(0,1fr) minmax(360px,.8fr);gap:16px}.security-chart,.security-latest,.security-table-card{padding:18px}.security-chart header,.security-latest header{display:flex;justify-content:space-between}.security-chart header span,.security-latest header span{font-size:12px;color:#94a3b8}.security-latest-row{display:grid;grid-template-columns:10px 1fr auto;gap:10px;align-items:center;padding:13px 0;border-bottom:1px solid #eef2f7}.security-latest-row div{display:grid;gap:3px}.security-latest-row small,.security-latest-row time{color:#64748b;font-size:12px}.severity-dot{width:8px;height:8px;border-radius:99px;background:#3b82f6}.severity-dot.is-high{background:#f59e0b}.severity-dot.is-critical{background:#ef4444}.security-cell{display:grid;gap:3px}.security-cell span{font-size:11px;color:#94a3b8}.security-actions{display:flex;gap:6px}.security-note,.security-section-toolbar{display:flex;align-items:center;gap:9px;margin-bottom:16px;padding:12px 14px;border-radius:10px;background:#f8fafc;color:#475569;font-size:13px}.security-section-toolbar{justify-content:space-between}.security-error{display:flex;gap:8px;align-items:center;padding:12px 14px;border:1px solid #fecaca;border-radius:10px;background:#fef2f2;color:#b91c1c}.security-empty{height:265px;display:grid;place-items:center;color:#94a3b8}.security-dialog{display:grid;gap:16px}.security-target{display:grid;gap:4px;padding:14px;border-radius:10px;background:#f8fafc}.security-target span,.security-target small{color:#64748b;font-size:12px}.security-target strong{font-family:ui-monospace,monospace;font-size:18px}.security-form-grid{display:grid;grid-template-columns:1fr 1fr;gap:16px}.security-form-grid .security-error{grid-column:1/-1}.admin-security-page code{font-size:12px;color:#334155}@media(max-width:1100px){.security-kpis{grid-template-columns:repeat(2,1fr)}.security-overview-grid{grid-template-columns:1fr}}@media(max-width:640px){.security-kpis{grid-template-columns:1fr}.security-form-grid{grid-template-columns:1fr}}
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+import { useCallback, useEffect, useMemo, useState, type ComponentProps } from 'react';
+import type { EChartsOption } from 'echarts';
+import { AlertTriangle, Ban, BellRing, RefreshCw, Settings2, ShieldCheck, ShieldOff } from 'lucide-react';
+import { adminApi, type SecurityAlert, type SecurityBlock, type SecurityOverview, type SecurityProtectedNetwork, type SecurityRule } from '@/api/adminApi';
+import { Breadcrumb, Button, Chart, Input, Modal as BaseModal, Select, Table, Tabs, Tag, Textarea, type TableColumn } from '@/components/ui';
+import './AdminSecurityDetectionPage.css';
+
+const statusLabels: Record<string, string> = { open: '待处理', acknowledged: '已确认', blocked: '已封禁', block_failed: '封禁失败', ignored: '已忽略', requested: '执行中', failed: '失败', released: '已解封' };
+const severityLabels: Record<string, string> = { low: '低', medium: '中', high: '高', critical: '严重' };
+const durationOptions = [{ value: '600', label: '10分钟' }, { value: '3600', label: '1小时' }, { value: '86400', label: '24小时' }, { value: '604800', label: '7天' }];
+const formatTime = (value?: string | null) => value ? new Intl.DateTimeFormat('zh-CN', { month: '2-digit', day: '2-digit', hour: '2-digit', minute: '2-digit', hour12: false }).format(new Date(value)) : '—';
+function Modal(props: Omit<ComponentProps<typeof BaseModal>, 'open'>) { return <BaseModal {...props} open />; }
+
+export function AdminSecurityDetectionPage() {
+  const [overview, setOverview] = useState<SecurityOverview | null>(null);
+  const [alerts, setAlerts] = useState<SecurityAlert[]>([]);
+  const [rules, setRules] = useState<SecurityRule[]>([]);
+  const [blocks, setBlocks] = useState<SecurityBlock[]>([]);
+  const [networks, setNetworks] = useState<SecurityProtectedNetwork[]>([]);
+  const [loading, setLoading] = useState(true);
+  const [error, setError] = useState('');
+  const [blockAlert, setBlockAlert] = useState<SecurityAlert | null>(null);
+  const [editRule, setEditRule] = useState<SecurityRule | null>(null);
+  const [showNetwork, setShowNetwork] = useState(false);
+  const [reasonAction, setReasonAction] = useState<{ title: string; confirmLabel: string; run: (reason: string) => Promise<void> } | null>(null);
+
+  const load = useCallback(async () => {
+    setLoading(true); setError('');
+    try {
+      const [nextOverview, nextAlerts, nextRules, nextBlocks, nextNetworks] = await Promise.all([
+        adminApi.getSecurityOverview('24h'), adminApi.listSecurityAlerts({ pageSize: 100 }), adminApi.listSecurityRules(), adminApi.listSecurityBlocks(), adminApi.listProtectedNetworks(),
+      ]);
+      setOverview(nextOverview); setAlerts(nextAlerts.items); setRules(nextRules); setBlocks(nextBlocks); setNetworks(nextNetworks);
+    } catch (reason) { setError(reason instanceof Error ? reason.message : '安全检测数据加载失败'); }
+    finally { setLoading(false); }
+  }, []);
+  useEffect(() => { void load(); }, [load]);
+
+  const alertColumns: Array<TableColumn<SecurityAlert>> = [
+    { key: 'level', title: '级别', width: '80px', render: (item) => <Tag tone={item.severity === 'critical' ? 'danger' : item.severity === 'high' ? 'warning' : 'info'}>{severityLabels[item.severity] ?? item.severity}</Tag> },
+    { key: 'rule', title: '检测类型', width: '180px', render: (item) => <div className="security-cell"><strong>{item.rule.name}</strong><span>{item.rule.code}</span></div> },
+    { key: 'ip', title: '来源 IP', width: '150px', render: (item) => <code>{item.sourceIp}</code> },
+    { key: 'count', title: '窗口命中', width: '100px', render: (item) => `${item.eventCount} 次` },
+    { key: 'time', title: '最后发生', width: '140px', render: (item) => formatTime(item.lastOccurredAt) },
+    { key: 'status', title: '状态', width: '96px', render: (item) => <Tag tone={item.status === 'blocked' ? 'success' : item.status === 'block_failed' ? 'danger' : 'neutral'}>{statusLabels[item.status] ?? item.status}</Tag> },
+    { key: 'action', title: '人工处置', width: '190px', render: (item) => <div className="security-actions"><Button disabled={!['open', 'acknowledged', 'block_failed'].includes(item.status)} onClick={() => setBlockAlert(item)} size="sm" variant="danger">封禁</Button><Button disabled={!['open', 'acknowledged', 'block_failed'].includes(item.status)} onClick={() => void ignore(item)} size="sm" variant="ghost">忽略</Button></div> },
+  ];
+  function ignore(item: SecurityAlert) { setReasonAction({ title: `忽略告警 · ${item.sourceIp}`, confirmLabel: '确认忽略', run: async (reason) => { await adminApi.ignoreSecurityAlert(item.id, reason); await load(); } }); }
+
+  const ruleColumns: Array<TableColumn<SecurityRule>> = [
+    { key: 'name', title: '规则', width: '230px', render: (item) => <div className="security-cell"><strong>{item.name}</strong><span>{item.code}</span></div> },
+    { key: 'source', title: '数据源', width: '110px', render: (item) => item.sourceType },
+    { key: 'threshold', title: '阈值 / 窗口', width: '150px', render: (item) => `${item.threshold} 次 / ${item.windowSeconds} 秒` },
+    { key: 'cooldown', title: '冷却', width: '100px', render: (item) => `${item.cooldownSeconds} 秒` },
+    { key: 'version', title: '生效版本', width: '120px', render: (item) => <Tag tone={item.applyStatus === 'effective' ? 'success' : item.applyStatus === 'failed' ? 'danger' : 'warning'}>{item.effectiveVersion}/{item.configVersion}</Tag> },
+    { key: 'enabled', title: '启用', width: '90px', render: (item) => <Tag tone={item.enabled ? 'success' : 'neutral'}>{item.enabled ? '启用' : '停用'}</Tag> },
+    { key: 'action', title: '操作', width: '90px', render: (item) => <Button onClick={() => setEditRule(item)} size="sm" variant="ghost">配置</Button> },
+  ];
+  const blockColumns: Array<TableColumn<SecurityBlock>> = [
+    { key: 'ip', title: 'IP', width: '160px', render: (item) => <code>{item.sourceIp}</code> }, { key: 'executor', title: '执行器', width: '140px', render: (item) => item.executor },
+    { key: 'status', title: '状态', width: '100px', render: (item) => <Tag tone={item.status === 'blocked' ? 'success' : item.status === 'failed' ? 'danger' : 'neutral'}>{statusLabels[item.status] ?? item.status}</Tag> },
+    { key: 'reason', title: '原因', width: '260px', render: (item) => item.reason }, { key: 'expiry', title: '到期时间', width: '150px', render: (item) => formatTime(item.expiresAt) }, { key: 'error', title: '执行结果', width: '220px', render: (item) => item.lastError ?? '已由执行器回读确认' },
+    { key: 'action', title: '操作', width: '90px', render: (item) => <Button disabled={item.status !== 'blocked'} onClick={() => void releaseBlock(item)} size="sm" variant="ghost">解封</Button> },
+  ];
+  function releaseBlock(item: SecurityBlock) { setReasonAction({ title: `人工解封 · ${item.sourceIp}`, confirmLabel: '确认解封', run: async (reason) => { await adminApi.unblockSecurityBlock(item.id, reason); await load(); } }); }
+  const networkColumns: Array<TableColumn<SecurityProtectedNetwork>> = [
+    { key: 'network', title: 'IP / 网段', width: '180px', render: (item) => <code>{item.network}</code> }, { key: 'name', title: '名称', width: '180px', render: (item) => item.name }, { key: 'reason', title: '保护原因', width: '320px', render: (item) => item.reason }, { key: 'status', title: '状态', width: '100px', render: (item) => <Tag tone={item.enabled ? 'success' : 'neutral'}>{item.enabled ? '保护中' : '已停用'}</Tag> },
+  ];
+  const chartOption = useMemo<EChartsOption>(() => ({ tooltip: { trigger: 'item' }, legend: { bottom: 0, type: 'scroll' }, series: [{ type: 'pie', radius: ['52%', '76%'], center: ['50%', '43%'], label: { show: false }, data: overview?.sourceDistribution ?? [] }] }), [overview]);
+
+  const tabs = [
+    { value: 'overview', label: '总览', content: <><div className="security-overview-grid"><article className="surface security-chart"><header><strong>24小时检测来源</strong><span>真实事件聚合</span></header>{overview?.sourceDistribution.length ? <Chart height={265} option={chartOption} /> : <div className="security-empty">暂无检测事件</div>}</article><article className="surface security-latest"><header><strong>最新告警</strong><span>{overview?.alerts.length ?? 0} 条</span></header>{overview?.alerts.slice(0, 6).map((item) => <div className="security-latest-row" key={item.id}><span className={`severity-dot is-${item.severity}`} /><div><strong>{item.rule.name}</strong><small>{item.sourceIp} · {item.eventCount} 次</small></div><time>{formatTime(item.lastOccurredAt)}</time></div>)}</article></div></> },
+    { value: 'alerts', label: '告警中心', content: <section className="surface security-table-card"><Table columns={alertColumns} data={alerts} emptyText="暂无安全告警" rowKey="id" /></section> },
+    { value: 'rules', label: '规则配置', content: <section className="surface security-table-card"><div className="security-note"><Settings2 size={17} /><span>所有阈值来自数据库；修改后必须由受限安全代理验证并应用，版本一致才标记生效。</span></div><Table columns={ruleColumns} data={rules} rowKey="id" /></section> },
+    { value: 'blocks', label: '封禁记录', content: <section className="surface security-table-card"><Table columns={blockColumns} data={blocks} emptyText="暂无人工封禁记录" rowKey="id" /></section> },
+    { value: 'protected', label: '保护名单', content: <section className="surface security-table-card"><div className="security-section-toolbar"><span>受保护的运维出口、内网和可信代理永远不能从面板封禁。</span><Button onClick={() => setShowNetwork(true)}>新增保护网段</Button></div><Table columns={networkColumns} data={networks} emptyText="暂无保护网段" rowKey="id" /></section> },
+  ];
+
+  return <section className="page-stack admin-security-page"><div className="page-heading security-heading"><div><Breadcrumb items={['安全控制', '安全检测与封禁']} /><h1>安全检测与封禁</h1><p>Fail2ban 与业务事件只负责检测，由运营人员复核后人工处置</p></div><Button disabled={loading} icon={<RefreshCw className={loading ? 'is-spinning' : ''} size={16} />} onClick={() => void load()} variant="ghost">刷新</Button></div>
+    {error ? <div className="security-error" role="alert"><AlertTriangle size={18} />{error}</div> : null}
+    <div className="security-kpis"><Kpi icon={<BellRing />} label="24小时检测事件" value={overview?.totalEvents ?? 0} /><Kpi icon={<AlertTriangle />} label="待处置告警" value={overview?.activeAlerts ?? 0} danger={Boolean(overview?.criticalAlerts)} /><Kpi icon={<Ban />} label="生效封禁" value={overview?.activeBlocks ?? 0} /><Kpi icon={overview?.health.agent === 'healthy' ? <ShieldCheck /> : <ShieldOff />} label="安全代理" value={overview?.health.agent === 'healthy' ? '在线' : '不可用'} danger={overview?.health.agent !== 'healthy'} /></div>
+    <Tabs items={tabs} />
+    {blockAlert ? <BlockDialog alert={blockAlert} onClose={() => setBlockAlert(null)} onSaved={async () => { setBlockAlert(null); await load(); }} /> : null}
+    {editRule ? <RuleDialog rule={editRule} onClose={() => setEditRule(null)} onSaved={async () => { setEditRule(null); await load(); }} /> : null}
+    {showNetwork ? <NetworkDialog onClose={() => setShowNetwork(false)} onSaved={async () => { setShowNetwork(false); await load(); }} /> : null}
+    {reasonAction ? <ActionReasonDialog action={reasonAction} onClose={() => setReasonAction(null)} /> : null}
+  </section>;
+}
+
+function Kpi({ icon, label, value, danger = false }: { icon: React.ReactNode; label: string; value: React.ReactNode; danger?: boolean }) { return <article className={`surface security-kpi ${danger ? 'is-danger' : ''}`}><div>{icon}</div><span>{label}</span><strong>{value}</strong></article>; }
+function BlockDialog({ alert, onClose, onSaved }: { alert: SecurityAlert; onClose: () => void; onSaved: () => void }) { const [duration, setDuration] = useState(String(alert.rule.defaultBlockSeconds)); const [reason, setReason] = useState(''); const [saving, setSaving] = useState(false); const [error, setError] = useState(''); const executor = alert.rule.code.startsWith('admin_') || alert.rule.code.startsWith('client_') ? 'Nginx Real-IP deny' : 'nftables'; async function save() { setSaving(true); setError(''); try { await adminApi.blockSecurityAlert(alert.id, { durationSeconds: Number(duration), reason }); await onSaved(); } catch (reason) { setError(reason instanceof Error ? reason.message : '封禁失败'); } finally { setSaving(false); } } return <Modal title="确认人工封禁" onClose={onClose} footer={<><Button onClick={onClose} variant="ghost">取消</Button><Button disabled={saving || reason.trim().length < 5} onClick={() => void save()} variant="danger">{saving ? '执行并回读中' : '确认封禁'}</Button></>}><div className="security-dialog"><div className="security-target"><span>目标 IP</span><strong>{alert.sourceIp}</strong><small>{alert.rule.name} · 窗口命中 {alert.eventCount} 次</small></div><Input disabled label="服务端固定执行器" value={executor} /><Select label="封禁时长" options={durationOptions.filter((item) => Number(item.value) <= alert.rule.maximumBlockSeconds)} value={duration} onChange={(event) => setDuration(event.target.value)} /><Textarea label="封禁原因" minLength={5} onChange={(event) => setReason(event.target.value)} required value={reason} />{error ? <div className="security-error">{error}</div> : null}</div></Modal>; }
+function RuleDialog({ rule, onClose, onSaved }: { rule: SecurityRule; onClose: () => void; onSaved: () => void }) { const [value, setValue] = useState(rule); const [saving, setSaving] = useState(false); const [error, setError] = useState(''); const number = (key: keyof SecurityRule) => (event: React.ChangeEvent<HTMLInputElement>) => setValue({ ...value, [key]: Number(event.target.value) }); async function save() { setSaving(true); try { await adminApi.updateSecurityRule(rule.id, value); await onSaved(); } catch (reason) { setError(reason instanceof Error ? reason.message : '规则保存失败'); } finally { setSaving(false); } } return <Modal title={`配置规则 · ${rule.name}`} onClose={onClose} footer={<><Button onClick={onClose} variant="ghost">取消</Button><Button disabled={saving} onClick={() => void save()}>{saving ? '验证并应用中' : '保存并应用'}</Button></>}><div className="security-form-grid"><Select label="启用状态" options={[{ value: 'true', label: '启用' }, { value: 'false', label: '停用' }]} value={String(value.enabled)} onChange={(event) => setValue({ ...value, enabled: event.target.value === 'true' })} /><Select label="告警级别" options={['low','medium','high','critical'].map((item) => ({ value: item, label: severityLabels[item] }))} value={value.severity} onChange={(event) => setValue({ ...value, severity: event.target.value })} /><Input label="触发次数" min={1} onChange={number('threshold')} type="number" value={value.threshold} /><Input label="检测窗口（秒）" min={10} onChange={number('windowSeconds')} type="number" value={value.windowSeconds} /><Input label="告警冷却（秒）" min={0} onChange={number('cooldownSeconds')} type="number" value={value.cooldownSeconds} /><Input label="默认封禁（秒）" min={600} onChange={number('defaultBlockSeconds')} type="number" value={value.defaultBlockSeconds} /><Input label="最大封禁（秒）" min={600} onChange={number('maximumBlockSeconds')} type="number" value={value.maximumBlockSeconds} />{error ? <div className="security-error">{error}</div> : null}</div></Modal>; }
+function NetworkDialog({ onClose, onSaved }: { onClose: () => void; onSaved: () => void }) { const [value, setValue] = useState({ network: '', name: '', reason: '' }); const [error, setError] = useState(''); async function save() { try { await adminApi.addProtectedNetwork(value); await onSaved(); } catch (reason) { setError(reason instanceof Error ? reason.message : '新增失败'); } } return <Modal title="新增保护网段" onClose={onClose} footer={<><Button onClick={onClose} variant="ghost">取消</Button><Button disabled={!value.network || !value.name || !value.reason} onClick={() => void save()}>确认保护</Button></>}><div className="security-dialog"><Input label="IP 或 CIDR" placeholder="例如 203.0.113.10 或 10.0.0.0/8" value={value.network} onChange={(event) => setValue({ ...value, network: event.target.value })} /><Input label="名称" value={value.name} onChange={(event) => setValue({ ...value, name: event.target.value })} /><Textarea label="保护原因" value={value.reason} onChange={(event) => setValue({ ...value, reason: event.target.value })} />{error ? <div className="security-error">{error}</div> : null}</div></Modal>; }
+
+function ActionReasonDialog({ action, onClose }: { action: { title: string; confirmLabel: string; run: (reason: string) => Promise<void> }; onClose: () => void }) { const [reason, setReason] = useState(''); const [saving, setSaving] = useState(false); const [error, setError] = useState(''); async function save() { setSaving(true); setError(''); try { await action.run(reason); onClose(); } catch (cause) { setError(cause instanceof Error ? cause.message : '操作失败'); } finally { setSaving(false); } } return <Modal title={action.title} onClose={onClose} footer={<><Button onClick={onClose} variant="ghost">取消</Button><Button disabled={saving || reason.trim().length < 5} onClick={() => void save()}>{saving ? '处理中' : action.confirmLabel}</Button></>}><div className="security-dialog"><Textarea autoFocus label="操作原因" minLength={5} onChange={(event) => setReason(event.target.value)} required value={reason} />{error ? <div className="security-error">{error}</div> : null}</div></Modal>; }
@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ function AdminAuthenticatedLayout({ session }: { session: LoginSession }) {
          icon: Shield,
          items: [
            { label: '风控规则', to: '/admin/risk-rules', icon: Shield },
+            { label: '安全检测与封禁', to: '/admin/security-detection', icon: ShieldCheck },
            { label: '签名清退预警', to: '/admin/signature-retirement', icon: AlertTriangle },
            { label: '企业黑名单', to: '/admin/enterprise-blacklist', icon: UserX },
            { label: '全局黑名单', to: '/admin/global-blacklist', icon: ShieldOff },
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ import { AdminSignatureRetirementPage } from '@/apps/admin/AdminSignatureRetirem
 import { AdminDrainageAuditPage } from '@/apps/admin/AdminDrainageAuditPage';
 import { AdminSystemLogsPage } from '@/apps/admin/AdminSystemLogsPage';
 import { AdminSystemMonitoringPage } from '@/apps/admin/system-monitoring/AdminSystemMonitoringPage';
+import { AdminSecurityDetectionPage } from '@/apps/admin/security-detection/AdminSecurityDetectionPage';
 import { AdminTemplateAuditPage } from '@/apps/admin/AdminTemplateAuditPage';
 import { AdminUsersPage } from '@/apps/admin/AdminUsersPage';
 import { AdminEnterpriseAuditPage } from '@/apps/admin/AdminEnterpriseAuditPage';
@@ -144,6 +145,7 @@ export function AppRoutes() {
        <Route path="drainage-detection-rules" element={<AdminDrainageDetectionRulesPage />} />
        <Route path="system-logs" element={<AdminSystemLogsPage />} />
        <Route path="system-monitoring" element={<AdminSystemMonitoringPage />} />
+        <Route path="security-detection" element={<AdminSecurityDetectionPage />} />
        <Route path="*" element={<PagePlaceholder />} />
      </Route>
    </Routes>
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ SMS_RECEIPT_TIMEOUT_HOURS="${SMS_RECEIPT_TIMEOUT_HOURS:-72}"
 SMS_RECEIPT_TIMEOUT_SCAN_INTERVAL_MS="${SMS_RECEIPT_TIMEOUT_SCAN_INTERVAL_MS:-300000}"
 PROMETHEUS_URL="${PROMETHEUS_URL:-http://127.0.0.1:9090}"
 PROMETHEUS_QUERY_TIMEOUT_MS="${PROMETHEUS_QUERY_TIMEOUT_MS:-5000}"
+SECURITY_EVENT_TOKEN="${SECURITY_EVENT_TOKEN:-$(openssl rand -hex 32 | tr -d '\n')}"
+SECURITY_BUILTIN_PROTECTED_NETWORKS="${SECURITY_BUILTIN_PROTECTED_NETWORKS:-${CMPP_PUBLIC_HOST}/32}"

 if [[ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]]; then
  echo "Run as root." >&2
@@ -45,7 +47,7 @@ install_packages() {
  log "Installing OS packages"
  if command -v apt-get >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    apt-get update
-    DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y ca-certificates curl gnupg git nginx redis-server postgresql postgresql-contrib build-essential tar gzip xz-utils openssl
+    DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y ca-certificates curl gnupg git nginx redis-server postgresql postgresql-contrib build-essential tar gzip xz-utils openssl fail2ban nftables
  elif command -v dnf >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    dnf install -y ca-certificates curl git nginx redis postgresql-server postgresql-contrib gcc gcc-c++ make tar gzip xz openssl
    if [[ ! -d /var/lib/pgsql/data/base ]]; then
@@ -208,6 +210,10 @@ GATEWAY_CMPP_ADDR=${GATEWAY_CMPP_ADDR}
 CMPP_PUBLIC_HOST=${CMPP_PUBLIC_HOST}
 CMPP_PUBLIC_PORT=${CMPP_PUBLIC_PORT}
 API_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:${API_PORT}/api
+SECURITY_EVENT_TOKEN=${SECURITY_EVENT_TOKEN}
+SECURITY_AGENT_SOCKET=/run/cmpp-security-agent/agent.sock
+TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS=127.0.0.1,::1
+SECURITY_BUILTIN_PROTECTED_NETWORKS=${SECURITY_BUILTIN_PROTECTED_NETWORKS}
 EOF
  chmod 600 /etc/cmpp-platform/cmpp-platform.env
  cat >/etc/cmpp-platform/minio.env <<EOF
@@ -221,6 +227,11 @@ write_services() {
  log "Writing systemd and nginx configuration"
  local node_bin
  node_bin="$(command -v node)"
+  getent group cmpp-security >/dev/null || groupadd --system cmpp-security
+  id cmpp-api >/dev/null 2>&1 || useradd --system --home-dir /nonexistent --shell /usr/sbin/nologin --gid cmpp-security cmpp-api
+  install -d -m 0750 /etc/nginx/snippets
+  touch /etc/nginx/snippets/cmpp-security-deny.conf
+  chmod 0640 /etc/nginx/snippets/cmpp-security-deny.conf
  cat >/etc/systemd/system/cmpp-minio.service <<'EOF'
 [Unit]
 Description=CMPP MinIO object storage
@@ -244,6 +255,8 @@ Description=CMPP Platform API
 After=network.target postgresql.service redis.service cmpp-minio.service

 [Service]
+User=cmpp-api
+Group=cmpp-security
 WorkingDirectory=${APP_DIR}/api
 EnvironmentFile=/etc/cmpp-platform/cmpp-platform.env
 ExecStart=${node_bin} dist/main.js
@@ -286,6 +299,7 @@ server {
  gzip_min_length 1024;
  gzip_comp_level 5;
  gzip_types application/json application/javascript text/javascript text/css text/plain text/csv image/svg+xml;
+  include /etc/nginx/snippets/cmpp-security-deny.conf;

  location /api/ {
    proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:${API_PORT}/api/;
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ rm -rf api/dist api/tsconfig.build.tsbuildinfo "$APP_DIR/dist/cmpp-gateway"
 npm run build
 npm --prefix api run build
 (cd gateway && GOPROXY="${GOPROXY:-https://goproxy.cn,direct}" /usr/local/bin/go build -o "$APP_DIR/dist/cmpp-gateway" ./cmd/gateway)
+(cd gateway && GOPROXY="${GOPROXY:-https://goproxy.cn,direct}" /usr/local/bin/go build -o "$APP_DIR/dist/cmpp-security-agent" ./cmd/security-agent)
 chmod 755 "$APP_DIR/dist" "$APP_DIR/dist/assets"
 find "$APP_DIR/dist/assets" -type d -exec chmod 755 {} +
 find "$APP_DIR/dist/assets" -type f -exec chmod 644 {} +
@@ -64,6 +65,9 @@ chmod 600 "$ADMIN_CREDENTIAL_FILE" || true
 echo "[deploy] Ensuring runtime log directories"
 install -d -m 0755 "$APP_DIR/logs/api" "$APP_DIR/logs/gateway"

+echo "[deploy] Installing restricted security boundary"
+bash "$APP_DIR/tools/security/install-security-agent.sh"
+
 echo "[deploy] Ensuring HTTP response compression"
 cat >/etc/nginx/conf.d/cmpp-compression.conf <<'EOF'
 gzip on;
@@ -85,6 +89,7 @@ else
  systemctl enable --now cmpp-api cmpp-gateway nginx
 fi
 systemctl restart cmpp-gateway
+systemctl restart cmpp-security-agent
 systemctl restart cmpp-api
 systemctl restart nginx

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -Eeuo pipefail
+
+APP_DIR="${APP_DIR:-/opt/cmpp-platform}"
+if [[ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]]; then echo "Run as root." >&2; exit 1; fi
+for command_name in fail2ban-client nft nginx systemctl; do command -v "$command_name" >/dev/null || { echo "Missing command: $command_name" >&2; exit 1; }; done
+[[ -x "$APP_DIR/dist/cmpp-security-agent" ]] || { echo "Missing built security agent" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+getent group cmpp-security >/dev/null || groupadd --system cmpp-security
+id cmpp-api >/dev/null 2>&1 || useradd --system --home-dir /nonexistent --shell /usr/sbin/nologin cmpp-api
+usermod -a -G cmpp-security cmpp-api
+install -d -o root -g cmpp-security -m 0770 /run/cmpp-security-agent
+install -d -o root -g cmpp-security -m 0750 /var/lib/cmpp-security-agent
+install -d -o cmpp-api -g cmpp-security -m 0750 "$APP_DIR/logs/api"
+[[ -d /var/lib/cmpp-platform/object-storage ]] && chown -R cmpp-api:cmpp-security /var/lib/cmpp-platform/object-storage
+
+install -m 0640 "$APP_DIR/deploy/security/cmpp-report-only.conf" /etc/fail2ban/action.d/cmpp-report-only.conf
+install -m 0640 "$APP_DIR/deploy/security/cmpp-http-scan.conf" /etc/fail2ban/filter.d/cmpp-http-scan.conf
+install -d -m 0750 /etc/nginx/snippets /etc/nftables.d
+touch /etc/nginx/snippets/cmpp-security-deny.conf
+chmod 0640 /etc/nginx/snippets/cmpp-security-deny.conf
+
+cat >/etc/nftables.d/cmpp-security.nft <<'EOF'
+table inet cmpp_security {
+  set blocked_ipv4 { type ipv4_addr; flags timeout; }
+  set blocked_ipv6 { type ipv6_addr; flags timeout; }
+  chain input { type filter hook input priority -10; policy accept; ip saddr @blocked_ipv4 drop; ip6 saddr @blocked_ipv6 drop; }
+}
+EOF
+grep -q 'cmpp-security.nft' /etc/nftables.conf || printf '\ninclude "/etc/nftables.d/cmpp-security.nft"\n' >>/etc/nftables.conf
+nft -c -f /etc/nftables.conf
+nft list table inet cmpp_security >/dev/null 2>&1 || nft -f /etc/nftables.d/cmpp-security.nft
+
+sed "s#/opt/cmpp-platform/current#$APP_DIR#g" "$APP_DIR/deploy/security/cmpp-security-agent.service" >/etc/systemd/system/cmpp-security-agent.service
+install -d -m 0755 /etc/systemd/system/cmpp-api.service.d
+cat >/etc/systemd/system/cmpp-api.service.d/security-boundary.conf <<EOF
+[Service]
+User=cmpp-api
+Group=cmpp-security
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectSystem=true
+ReadWritePaths=$APP_DIR/logs/api /var/lib/cmpp-platform/object-storage
+EOF
+
+fail2ban-client -t
+nginx -t
+systemctl daemon-reload
+systemctl enable cmpp-security-agent
+echo "Security boundary installed. Restart cmpp-security-agent and cmpp-api only in the approved release window."
				`@@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				.admin-security-page{gap:20px}.security-heading{align-items:flex-end}.security-heading h1{margin:10px 0 4px;font-size:26px}.security-heading p{margin:0;color:#64748b}.security-kpis{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(4,minmax(0,1fr));gap:14px}.security-kpi{display:grid;grid-template-columns:42px 1fr;grid-template-rows:auto auto;gap:3px 12px;padding:18px}.security-kpi>div{grid-row:1/3;width:42px;height:42px;border-radius:12px;display:grid;place-items:center;background:#e8f0ff;color:#2563eb}.security-kpi>div svg{width:20px}.security-kpi span{font-size:13px;color:#64748b}.security-kpi strong{font-size:24px;line-height:1.1}.security-kpi.is-danger>div{background:#fef2f2;color:#dc2626}.security-overview-grid{display:grid;grid-template-columns:minmax(0,1fr) minmax(360px,.8fr);gap:16px}.security-chart,.security-latest,.security-table-card{padding:18px}.security-chart header,.security-latest header{display:flex;justify-content:space-between}.security-chart header span,.security-latest header span{font-size:12px;color:#94a3b8}.security-latest-row{display:grid;grid-template-columns:10px 1fr auto;gap:10px;align-items:center;padding:13px 0;border-bottom:1px solid #eef2f7}.security-latest-row div{display:grid;gap:3px}.security-latest-row small,.security-latest-row time{color:#64748b;font-size:12px}.severity-dot{width:8px;height:8px;border-radius:99px;background:#3b82f6}.severity-dot.is-high{background:#f59e0b}.severity-dot.is-critical{background:#ef4444}.security-cell{display:grid;gap:3px}.security-cell span{font-size:11px;color:#94a3b8}.security-actions{display:flex;gap:6px}.security-note,.security-section-toolbar{display:flex;align-items:center;gap:9px;margin-bottom:16px;padding:12px 14px;border-radius:10px;background:#f8fafc;color:#475569;font-size:13px}.security-section-toolbar{justify-content:space-between}.security-error{display:flex;gap:8px;align-items:center;padding:12px 14px;border:1px solid #fecaca;border-radius:10px;background:#fef2f2;color:#b91c1c}.security-empty{height:265px;display:grid;place-items:center;color:#94a3b8}.security-dialog{display:grid;gap:16px}.security-target{display:grid;gap:4px;padding:14px;border-radius:10px;background:#f8fafc}.security-target span,.security-target small{color:#64748b;font-size:12px}.security-target strong{font-family:ui-monospace,monospace;font-size:18px}.security-form-grid{display:grid;grid-template-columns:1fr 1fr;gap:16px}.security-form-grid .security-error{grid-column:1/-1}.admin-security-page code{font-size:12px;color:#334155}@media(max-width:1100px){.security-kpis{grid-template-columns:repeat(2,1fr)}.security-overview-grid{grid-template-columns:1fr}}@media(max-width:640px){.security-kpis{grid-template-columns:1fr}.security-form-grid{grid-template-columns:1fr}}